CVE-2023-46102
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe Android Client application, when enrolled to the AppHub server, connects to an MQTT broker to exchange messages and receive commands to execute on the HMI device. The protocol builds on top of MQTT to implement the remote management of the device is encrypted with a hard-coded DES symmetric key, that can be retrieved reversing both the Android Client application and the server-side web application. This issue allows an attacker able to control a malicious MQTT broker on the same subnet network of the device, to craft malicious messages and send them to the HMI device, executing arbitrary commands on the device itself.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe Android Client uses a hard-coded DES symmetric key to encrypt MQTT-based communication with the AppHub server for remote HMI device management. An attacker who can control a malicious MQTT broker on the same subnet can retrieve this key through reverse engineering and send specially crafted messages to execute arbitrary commands on the HMI device.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE dataall versionsall versionsall versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Adjacent
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify the HMI device modelAccess the device web interface or check the physical device label to confirm the model number is WR2107, WR2110, or WR2115Affected if The model is one of these three: WR2107, WR2110, or WR2115
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Verify MQTT/AppHub remote management is enabledLog into the device web interface and navigate to Settings > Network or Remote Access to check if MQTT-based AppHub remote management is configured or enabledAffected if MQTT connection to AppHub server is enabled or configured on the device
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Inspect MQTT connection configurationCheck the device MQTT client settings for the AppHub broker address, typically found in the remote management or AppHub configuration section of the web interfaceAffected if The device is configured to connect to an AppHub MQTT broker for remote HMI management
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Confirm the installed firmware versionAccess the device web interface and locate the firmware version information, usually under System > Info or AboutAffected if Any firmware version is installed on an affected model (all versions are vulnerable)
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Check network connections for AppHub trafficUse the device diagnostics or network monitoring to observe outbound MQTT connections to known AppHub server addressesAffected if The device is actively communicating with AppHub over MQTT
The user is affected if they have a WR2107, WR2110, or WR2115 HMI panel with MQTT-based AppHub remote management enabled or configured.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataReplace the hard-coded DES key with proper cryptographic key management (e.g., key rotation, secure key storage), implement mutual TLS (mTLS) for MQTT connections, and add broker authentication to prevent unauthorized brokers from accepting connections.
- Consultation10.0 h
- Implementation24.0 h
- Testing16.0 h
- Review / QA8.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $16,256.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2023-46102 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2023-46102 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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