CVE-2024-47197
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedExposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor, Insecure Storage of Sensitive Information vulnerability in Maven Archetype Plugin. This issue affects Maven Archetype Plugin: from 3.2.1 before 3.3.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 3.3.0, which fixes the issue. Archetype integration testing creates a file called ./target/classes/archetype-it/archetype-settings.xml This file contains all the content from the users ~/.m2/settings.xml file, which often contains information they do not want to publish. We expect that on many developer machines, this also contains credentials. When the user runs mvn verify again (without a mvn clean), this file becomes part of the final artifact. If a developer were to publish this into Maven Central or any other remote repository (whether as a release or a snapshot) their credentials would be published without them knowing.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe Maven Archetype Plugin versions 3.2.1 through 3.2.x create a file at ./target/classes/archetype-it/archetype-settings.xml during integration testing that copies the user's entire ~/.m2/settings.xml, which typically contains server credentials and authentication tokens. Without a 'mvn clean' between runs, this sensitive file becomes embedded in the final artifact and gets published to remote repositories if the artifact is deployed.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 3.2.1CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Check Maven Archetype Plugin versionInspect your project's pom.xml or run 'mvn archetype:help' to determine the version of the Maven Archetype Plugin in use. Also check your effective POM via 'mvn help:effective-pom'.Affected if The Maven Archetype Plugin version is 3.2.1 through 3.2.x (any version in the 3.2 line before 3.3.0)
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Locate the sensitive file in target directoryCheck if the file ./target/classes/archetype-it/archetype-settings.xml exists in your project directory.Affected if This file exists in the target directory after running archetype:integration-test or any integration test phase
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Inspect the file for credentialsOpen ./target/classes/archetype-it/archetype-settings.xml and examine its contents. Look for <server> blocks containing <username>, <password>, or <privateKey> elements.Affected if The file contains server credentials, authentication tokens, or private keys in plain text or base64 encoding
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Check packaged artifacts for embedded sensitive fileIf you have published JAR or other artifacts, inspect them using 'jar tf your-artifact.jar | grep archetype-settings' or extract and search for the path archetype-it/archetype-settings.xml.Affected if The sensitive file is present inside a built JAR, WAR, or other packaged artifact that has been published or shared
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Audit published remote repositoriesIf artifacts were deployed to remote repositories (Nexus, Artifactory, Maven Central), download and inspect the published JAR files for the presence of archetype-settings.xml.Affected if Artifacts hosted on remote repositories contain the sensitive settings file
You are affected if you used Maven Archetype Plugin versions 3.2.1-3.2.x and any built or published artifacts contain the archetype-settings.xml file from the target directory without a clean build.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedUpgrade Maven Archetype Plugin to version 3.3.0 or later, run 'mvn clean' to remove any existing sensitive files from target directories, audit published artifacts for exposure, and rotate any credentials that may have been disclosed.
3.3.0
- Update the Maven Archetype Plugin version in your project's pom.xml to version 3.3.0
- Run `mvn clean verify` to ensure the build uses the new version
- Before publishing any artifact, run `mvn clean` to remove any potentially exposed sensitive files from previous builds with the vulnerable version
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation2.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA6.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $4,064.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2024-47197 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2024-47197 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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