CVE-2024-56687
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: musb: Fix hardware lockup on first Rx endpoint request There is a possibility that a request's callback could be invoked from usb_ep_queue() (call trace below, supplemented with missing calls): req->complete from usb_gadget_giveback_request (drivers/usb/gadget/udc/core.c:999) usb_gadget_giveback_request from musb_g_giveback (drivers/usb/musb/musb_gadget.c:147) musb_g_giveback from rxstate (drivers/usb/musb/musb_gadget.c:784) rxstate from musb_ep_restart (drivers/usb/musb/musb_gadget.c:1169) musb_ep_restart from musb_ep_restart_resume_work (drivers/usb/musb/musb_gadget.c:1176) musb_ep_restart_resume_work from musb_queue_resume_work (drivers/usb/musb/musb_core.c:2279) musb_queue_resume_work from musb_gadget_queue (drivers/usb/musb/musb_gadget.c:1241) musb_gadget_queue from usb_ep_queue (drivers/usb/gadget/udc/core.c:300) According to the docstring of usb_ep_queue(), this should not happen: "Note that @req's ->complete() callback must never be called from within usb_ep_queue() as that can create deadlock situations." In fact, a hardware lockup might occur in the following sequence: 1. The gadget is initialized using musb_gadget_enable(). 2. Meanwhile, a packet arrives, and the RXPKTRDY flag is set, raising an interrupt. 3. If IRQs are enabled, the interrupt is handled, but musb_g_rx() finds an empty queue (next_request() returns NULL). The interrupt flag has already been cleared by the glue layer handler, but the RXPKTRDY flag remains set. 4. The first request is enqueued using usb_ep_queue(), leading to the call of req->complete(), as shown in the call trace above. 5. If the callback enables IRQs and another packet is waiting, step (3) repeats. The request queue is empty because usb_g_giveback() removes the request before invoking the callback. 6. The endpoint remains locked up, as the interrupt triggered by hardware setting the RXPKTRDY flag has been handled, but the flag itself remains set. For this scenario to occur, it is only necessary for IRQs to be enabled at some point during the complete callback. This happens with the USB Ethernet gadget, whose rx_complete() callback calls netif_rx(). If called in the task context, netif_rx() disables the bottom halves (BHs). When the BHs are re-enabled, IRQs are also enabled to allow soft IRQs to be processed. The gadget itself is initialized at module load (or at boot if built-in), but the first request is enqueued when the network interface is brought up, triggering rx_complete() in the task context via ioctl(). If a packet arrives while the interface is down, it can prevent the interface from receiving any further packets from the USB host. The situation is quite complicated with many parties involved. This particular issue can be resolved in several possible ways: 1. Ensure that callbacks never enable IRQs. This would be difficult to enforce, as discovering how netif_rx() interacts with interrupts was already quite challenging and u_ether is not the only function driver. Similar "bugs" could be hidden in other drivers as well. 2. Disable MUSB interrupts in musb_g_giveback() before calling the callback and re-enable them afterwars (by calling musb_{dis,en}able_interrupts(), for example). This would ensure that MUSB interrupts are not handled during the callback, even if IRQs are enabled. In fact, it would allow IRQs to be enabled when releasing the lock. However, this feels like an inelegant hack. 3. Modify the interrupt handler to clear the RXPKTRDY flag if the request queue is empty. While this approach also feels like a hack, it wastes CPU time by attempting to handle incoming packets when the software is not ready to process them. 4. Flush the Rx FIFO instead of calling rxstate() in musb_ep_restart(). This ensures that the hardware can receive packets when there is at least one request in the queue. Once I ---truncated---
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysisShared resources are accessed without correct locking, so concurrent operations interleave into inconsistent — and sometimes exploitable — states, or deadlock the service outright. These bugs are subtle and timing-dependent. The fix is correct, consistent locking or atomic operations around every shared resource.
General guidance for the improper locking class — the official description and references above are authoritative for this specific CVE. Want a bespoke review and a reviewed fix? Ask our team →
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data>= 5.18, < 6.1.120>= 6.2, < 6.6.64>= 6.7, < 6.11.11>= 6.12, < 6.12.2CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scoped6.1.1206.6.646.11.11
6.1.120 (for 6.1.y) or 6.6.64 (for 6.6.y) or 6.11.11 (for 6.7-6.11.y) or 6.12.2 (for 6.12.y)
- 1. Identify the currently running Linux kernel version using `uname -r` or `cat /proc/version`.
- 2. Determine which branch of the kernel you are running (e.g., 6.1.y, 6.6.y, 6.7-6.11.y, or 6.12.y).
- 3. Upgrade the kernel to the patched version for your branch: 6.1.120, 6.6.64, 6.11.11, or 6.12.2 respectively.
- 4. Reboot the system to load the fixed kernel.
- 5. For embedded systems or kernels built from source, apply the upstream commit 0c89445e6d475b78d37b64ae520831cd43af7db4 and rebuild the kernel.
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2024-56687 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2024-56687 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
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