Linux KernelOperating system · Linux
CVE-2025-22023
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: xhci: Don't skip on Stopped - Length Invalid Up until commit d56b0b2ab142 ("usb: xhci: ensure skipped isoc TDs are returned when isoc ring is stopped") in v6.11, the driver didn't skip missed isochronous TDs when handling Stoppend and Stopped - Length Invalid events. Instead, it erroneously cleared the skip flag, which would cause the ring to get stuck, as future events won't match the missed TD which is never removed from the queue until it's cancelled. This buggy logic seems to have been in place substantially unchanged since the 3.x series over 10 years ago, which probably speaks first and foremost about relative rarity of this case in normal usage, but by the spec I see no reason why it shouldn't be possible. After d56b0b2ab142, TDs are immediately skipped when handling those Stopped events. This poses a potential problem in case of Stopped - Length Invalid, which occurs either on completed TDs (likely already given back) or Link and No-Op TRBs. Such event won't be recognized as matching any TD (unless it's the rare Link TRB inside a TD) and will result in skipping all pending TDs, giving them back possibly before they are done, risking isoc data loss and maybe UAF by HW. As a compromise, don't skip and don't clear the skip flag on this kind of event. Then the next event will skip missed TDs. A downside of not handling Stopped - Length Invalid on a Link inside a TD is that if the TD is cancelled, its actual length will not be updated to account for TRBs (silently) completed before the TD was stopped. I had no luck producing this sequence of completion events so there is no compelling demonstration of any resulting disaster. It may be a very rare, obscure condition. The sole motivation for this patch is that if such unlikely event does occur, I'd rather risk reporting a cancelled partially done isoc frame as empty than gamble with UAF. This will be fixed more properly by looking at Stopped event's TRB pointer when making skipping decisions, but such rework is unlikely to be backported to v6.12, which will stay around for a few years.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysisMemory is used after it has been freed, so its contents — now potentially attacker-controlled — drive the program's behaviour. With careful heap grooming this becomes code execution. The fix requires disciplined ownership of memory and often a targeted rework of the object lifecycle.
General guidance for the use after free class — the official description and references above are authoritative for this specific CVE. Want a bespoke review and a reviewed fix? Ask our team →
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data
Linux KernelOperating system
>= 6.11, < 6.12.22>= 6.13, < 6.13.10= 6.14CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scoped6.12.226.13.10
6.12.22 or later (for 6.12.x), 6.13.10 or later (for 6.13.x), or 6.14.1 or later (for 6.14.x)
- 1. Identify the current running kernel version using `uname -r`
- 2. Determine the appropriate upgrade target based on your distribution's kernel packages: for 6.12.x kernels upgrade to 6.12.22 or later, for 6.13.x upgrade to 6.13.10 or later, for 6.14.x upgrade to 6.14.1 or later
- 3. For Debian/Ubuntu: Run `apt update && apt upgrade linux-image-generic` to install the latest stable kernel
- 4. For RHEL/CentOS: Run `yum update kernel` to install the latest available kernel
- 5. For other distributions: Check your vendor's kernel repositories for the fixed versions (6.12.22+, 6.13.10+, or 6.14+)
- 6. Reboot the system into the new kernel after installation: `reboot`
- 7. Verify the fix is applied by checking the kernel version with `uname -r` and confirming it's >= the fixed version
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2025-22023 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2025-22023 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
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