CVE-2025-34403
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedMailEnable versions prior to 10.54 contain a reflected cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the FieldTo parameter of /Mondo/lang/sys/Forms/AddressBook.aspx. The FieldTo value is not properly sanitized when processed via a GET request and is reflected inside a <script> block in the JavaScript variable var fieldTo. By supplying a crafted payload that terminates the existing Finish() function, inserts attacker-controlled script, and comments out remaining code, a remote attacker can execute arbitrary JavaScript in a victim’s browser when the victim attempts to send an email. Successful exploitation can redirect victims to malicious sites, steal non-HttpOnly cookies, inject arbitrary HTML or CSS, and perform actions as the authenticated user.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceMailEnable versions prior to 10.54 have a reflected XSS vulnerability in the FieldTo parameter of /Mondo/lang/sys/Forms/AddressBook.aspx. The unsanitized FieldTo value from a GET request is directly embedded into a JavaScript variable (var fieldTo) inside a <script> block, allowing attackers to terminate the Finish() function and inject arbitrary JavaScript that executes in victim browsers when sending emails.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data< 10.54CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- Required
- Scope
- Changed
- Confidentiality
- Low
- Integrity
- Low
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Confirm MailEnable installationIdentify if MailEnable mail server is installed on the system by looking for the MailEnable installation directory, service, or web interface.Affected if MailEnable is found to be installed on the system
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Determine installed MailEnable versionLocate and retrieve the installed MailEnable version number using system utilities, configuration files, or the administration interface.Affected if The version is less than 10.54
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Verify vulnerable endpoint existsConfirm the presence of the /Mondo/lang/sys/Forms/AddressBook.aspx path in the MailEnable web interface.Affected if The endpoint exists and the installed version is below 10.54
A system is affected if MailEnable is installed with a version number lower than 10.54 and the AddressBook.aspx endpoint is accessible.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scoped10.54
Upgrade MailEnable to version 10.54 or later to obtain the patched version. Alternatively, implement input validation/sanitization on the FieldTo parameter before reflecting it in the response.
MailEnable 10.54
- 1. Back up the current MailEnable installation and configuration database before proceeding with any upgrade.
- 2. Download MailEnable version 10.54 from the official MailEnable website (mailenable.com).
- 3. Stop the MailEnable services to ensure a clean upgrade process.
- 4. Run the MailEnable 10.54 installer on the server.
- 5. Follow the installation wizard prompts, selecting the upgrade option when presented.
- 6. After installation completes, verify the upgrade was successful by checking the MailEnable version in the administration console.
- 7. Restart the MailEnable services.
- 8. Verify the vulnerability is remediated by attempting a test request to /Mondo/lang/sys/Forms/AddressBook.aspx with the FieldTo parameter - the input should no longer be reflected in the response without proper encoding.
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation2.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2025-34403 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2025-34403 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data