CVE-2025-34406
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedMailEnable versions prior to 10.54 contain a reflected cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the Id parameter of /Mobile/ContactDetails.aspx. The Id value is not properly sanitized when processed via a GET request and is reflected within a <script> block in the response. By supplying a crafted payload that terminates an existing JavaScript function, inserts attacker-controlled script, and comments out remaining code, a remote attacker can execute arbitrary JavaScript in a victim’s browser when the victim opens a malicious link. Successful exploitation can redirect victims to malicious sites, steal cookies not protected by HttpOnly, inject arbitrary HTML or CSS, and perform actions as the authenticated user.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceReflected XSS vulnerability in MailEnable's /Mobile/ContactDetails.aspx page where the Id parameter is not sanitized and is directly reflected within a <script> block. Attackers can inject arbitrary JavaScript by crafting a payload that terminates the existing JavaScript function, inserts malicious script, and comments out the remaining code.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data< 10.54CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- Required
- Scope
- Changed
- Confidentiality
- Low
- Integrity
- Low
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Confirm MailEnable installationCheck for MailEnable installation by looking for the MailEnable directory (typically at C:\Program Files\MailEnable or C:\Program Files (x86)\MailEnable), or check for the MailEnable services in Windows Services (MEIPVS, MEM, MESearch).Affected if MailEnable is not installed on the system.
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Determine installed MailEnable versionCheck the MailEnable version by opening the MailEnable Administrator, going to the General tab, or by reviewing the version information in the installation directory. Alternatively, check the registry key: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\MailEnable\InstallLevelAffected if The installed version is any version below 10.54.
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Verify Mobile web access is enabledCheck if the Mobile web access feature is enabled by reviewing IIS Manager for the Mobile virtual directory under the MailEnable web sites, or by attempting to access http://[server]/Mobile/ContactDetails.aspxAffected if The Mobile web component is accessible and the server responds to requests for ContactDetails.aspx.
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Test the vulnerable Id parameterSend a crafted request to /Mobile/ContactDetails.aspx with a test payload in the Id parameter (for example: Id=test</script><script>alert('XSS')</script>). Inspect the response to see if the payload is reflected unescaped within a <script> block.Affected if The Id parameter value is reflected verbatim in the response without HTML encoding, indicating the XSS vulnerability is present.
A user is affected if MailEnable version is below 10.54 AND the Mobile web component is accessible AND the ContactDetails.aspx page reflects the Id parameter without sanitization.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scoped10.54
Upgrade MailEnable to version 10.54 or later to patch this vulnerability.
10.54
- Upgrade MailEnable to version 10.54 or later to resolve the reflected XSS vulnerability in /Mobile/ContactDetails.aspx
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation2.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2025-34406 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2025-34406 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data