dbcve.org
Vision 60 FirmwareOperating system · Ghostrobotics

CVE-2025-41108

CRITICAL · 9.8 CVSS v3.1 Published 2025-10-22
Mitigation only
No fix yet — a mitigation exists. There is no fixed release. A documented workaround reduces exposure in the meantime.
See remediation →
100/100
Remediation priority · Urgent
Remotely reachable No privileges Zero-click

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
The communication protocol implemented in Ghost Robotics Vision 60 v0.27.2 could allow an attacker to send commands to the robot from an external attack station, impersonating the control station (tablet) and gaining unauthorised full control of the robot. The absence of encryption and authentication mechanisms in the communication protocol allows an attacker to capture legitimate traffic between the robot and the controller, replicate it, and send any valid command to the robot from any attacking computer or device. The communication protocol used in this interface is based on MAVLink, a widely documented protocol, which increases the likelihood of attack. There are two methods for connecting to the robot remotely: Wi-Fi and 4G/LTE.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · high confidence

The Ghost Robotics Vision 60 v0.27.2 uses an unencrypted, unauthenticated MAVLink-based protocol for robot-control station communication over Wi-Fi and 4G/LTE. Attackers can sniff legitimate traffic, replay commands, or inject arbitrary commands to achieve full remote control of the robot.

MitigationImplement mutual authentication and transport-layer encryption (e.g., MAVLink over TLS or MAVSec) for all robot-control communications, and network-segment the robot from untrusted networks.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.

NVD · CPE data
Vision 60 FirmwareOperating system
Affected:= 0.27.2

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Privileges
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Identify Vision 60 firmware version
    Access the robot's admin interface or check the system information via the command line interface (e.g., 'version' or 'system info' command). If you have SSH or console access, run: cat /etc/os-release or look for a version file in /opt/ghostrobotics/
    Affected if The firmware version is exactly 0.27.2
  2. Verify MAVLink protocol is in use
    Inspect network traffic between the control station and robot using a packet capture tool (e.g., tcpdump, Wireshark). Look for MAVLink packets on the communication channel - MAVLink typically uses UDP/TCP ports 14550 or 14540 by default
    Affected if MAVLink packets are visible in plaintext on the network and no TLS or MAVSec encryption is observed
  3. Check for encryption on robot-control communication
    Examine the robot's network configuration or the control station software settings. Look for transport security settings - check if MAVLink is configured over TLS, SSH tunnel, or MAVSec
    Affected if The communication channel uses unencrypted UDP/TCP without any transport-layer security wrapper
  4. Assess network exposure
    Review the robot's network interface configuration. Check if Wi-Fi or 4G/LTE interfaces are active and connected to networks. Verify if the robot is accessible from untrusted networks
    Affected if Wi-Fi or 4G/LTE interfaces are enabled and the robot communicates over these channels without a VPN or secure tunnel to the control station

You are affected if your Vision 60 runs firmware 0.27.2 AND uses unencrypted, unauthenticated MAVLink communication over Wi-Fi or 4G/LTE.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

From vendor data
Mitigation available No clean upgrade yet — mitigate in the meantime
Mitigation

Implement mutual authentication and transport-layer encryption (e.g., MAVLink over TLS or MAVSec) for all robot-control communications, and network-segment the robot from untrusted networks.

Fix this in Vision 60 Firmware Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation6.0 h
  • Implementation30.0 h
  • Testing16.0 h
  • Review / QA10.0 h
62.0 hours of engineering $10,800
Get help mitigating

An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $17,280.

Scan for this in your stack

Free · runs locally
dbcve dependency scanner

Check whether your project pulls in CVE-2025-41108 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.

Get it on GitHub Scan in the browser

References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2025-41108 in production — separate from our analysis above.

No notes yet

Be the first to add a field note for this CVE — a mitigation you’ve verified, a version caveat, or a link to a working fix. Sign in above to contribute.

What this is

A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.

What belongs here
  • Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
  • No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
  • No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data