Ac10 FirmwareOperating system · Tenda

CVE-2025-8178

HIGH · 8.8 CVSS v3.1 Published 2025-07-26
Mitigation only
No fix yet — a mitigation exists. There is no fixed release. A documented workaround reduces exposure in the meantime.
See remediation →
94/100
Remediation priority · Urgent
Remotely reachable Zero-click

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
A vulnerability classified as critical has been found in Tenda AC10 16.03.10.13. Affected is an unknown function of the file /goform/RequestsProcessLaid. The manipulation of the argument device1D leads to heap-based buffer overflow. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · high confidence

Heap-based buffer overflow in Tenda AC10 router firmware 16.03.10.13 in the /goform/RequestsProcessLaid endpoint. The 'device1D' parameter is copied to a heap buffer without bounds checking, allowing remote attackers to overwrite adjacent memory and potentially achieve remote code execution.

MitigationSince this is a firmware vulnerability in end-of-life consumer hardware with no vendor patch available, the primary remediation is network isolation (place device behind a firewall with no WAN exposure) or device replacement. If the router's remote management interface is accessible from WAN, disable it immediately.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.

NVD · CPE data
Ac10 FirmwareOperating system
Affected:= 16.03.10.13

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Privileges
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Identify the router model
    Access the router's web administration interface (typically at 192.168.0.1) or check the device label/packaging to confirm the model is Tenda AC10.
    Affected if The device is NOT a Tenda AC10 router.
  2. Check the installed firmware version
    Log into the router web interface and navigate to System Settings > Firmware Upgrade or System Status page. Record the firmware version displayed.
    Affected if The firmware version is exactly 16.03.10.13.
  3. Verify web management interface accessibility
    Attempt to access the router's web interface from a network location outside your local LAN (e.g., using the router's WAN/public IP). Check if port 80 or 443 is open on the WAN interface.
    Affected if The router's web management interface is accessible from the WAN/internet.
  4. Confirm the vulnerable endpoint exists
    Send an HTTP POST request to http://[router-ip]/goform/RequestsProcessLaid with a device1D parameter (e.g., device1D=test). A response (even an error) indicates the endpoint is active.
    Affected if The /goform/RequestsProcessLaid endpoint responds to requests with the device1D parameter.

You are affected if you have a Tenda AC10 router running firmware version 16.03.10.13 with the web interface network-accessible.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

From vendor data
Mitigation available No clean upgrade yet — mitigate in the meantime
Mitigation

Since this is a firmware vulnerability in end-of-life consumer hardware with no vendor patch available, the primary remediation is network isolation (place device behind a firewall with no WAN exposure) or device replacement. If the router's remote management interface is accessible from WAN, disable it immediately.

Fix this in Ac10 Firmware Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation2.0 h
  • Review / QA2.0 h
4.0 hours of engineering $760
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Scan for this in your stack

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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2025-8178 in production — separate from our analysis above.

No notes yet

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What this is

A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.

What belongs here
  • Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
  • No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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