CVE-2025-9068
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedA security issue exists within the Rockwell Automation Driver Package x64 Microsoft Installer File (MSI) repair functionality, installed with FTLinx. Authenticated attackers with valid Windows Users credentials can initiate a repair and hijack the resulting console window for vbpinstall.exe. This allows the launching of a command prompt running with SYSTEM-level privileges, allowing full access to all files, processes, and system resources.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceA vulnerability in the Rockwell Automation Driver Package x64 MSI repair functionality (FTLinx) allows authenticated Windows users to hijack the vbpinstall.exe console window during repair operations, enabling them to spawn a command prompt running with SYSTEM-level privileges and full system access.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data< 6.50CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Confirm Factorytalk Linx installationCheck for Factorytalk Linx in Windows Registry under HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall or look for the installation directory (typically C:\Program Files\Rockwell Software\FactoryTalk Linx or similar)Affected if Factorytalk Linx is installed on the system
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Identify installed versionLocate the version information in the registry or in the product's About/Information dialog within the Factorytalk Linx applicationAffected if The installed version is lower than 6.50 (e.g., 6.40, 6.30, etc.)
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Verify vbpinstall.exe existsSearch for vbpininstall.exe in the Factorytalk Linx installation directory and subfolders (typically in a Drivers or Support folder within the Rockwell Software directory)Affected if The vbpinstall.exe file is present in the installation directory
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Check repair operation accessibilityAttempt to initiate an MSI repair operation on the Factorytalk Linx installation via Windows Installer (msiexec /f {product-code} or through Programs and Features > Repair) or observe if standard users can trigger repair without elevated privilegesAffected if Authenticated Windows users can initiate MSI repair operations on the Factorytalk Linx installation
The system is affected if Factorytalk Linx is installed with a version lower than 6.50 and the vbpininstall.exe component exists, allowing authenticated users to potentially escalate privileges via MSI repair functionality.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scoped6.50
Apply the vendor patch from Rockwell Automation when available; in the interim, restrict file system access to the FTLinx installation directory and limit user ability to initiate MSI repair operations to mitigate local privilege escalation.
FactoryTalk Linx 6.50
- Back up the current FactoryTalk Linx configuration and any critical data
- Download FactoryTalk Linx version 6.50 or later from the official Rockwell Automation website
- Uninstall the current version of FactoryTalk Linx through Windows Control Panel > Programs and Features
- Install FactoryTalk Linx version 6.50 or later using the downloaded installer
- Restore the configuration if it was backed up separately
- Verify the installation was successful and test functionality
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2025-9068 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2025-9068 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data