Supplier Management SystemApplication · Campcodes

CVE-2026-0597

CRITICAL · 9.8 CVSS v3.1 Published 2026-01-05
Mitigation only
No fix yet — a mitigation exists. There is no fixed release. A documented workaround reduces exposure in the meantime.
See remediation →
100/100
Remediation priority · Urgent
Public exploit Remotely reachable No privileges Zero-click

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
A flaw has been found in Campcodes Supplier Management System 1.0. Affected by this issue is some unknown functionality of the file /retailer/edit_profile.php. This manipulation of the argument txtRetailerAddress causes sql injection. Remote exploitation of the attack is possible. The exploit has been published and may be used.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · high confidence

SQL injection vulnerability in Campcodes Supplier Management System 1.0 allows remote attackers to inject malicious SQL queries via the txtRetailerAddress parameter in /retailer/edit_profile.php. The vulnerability stems from unsanitized user input being directly concatenated into SQL queries.

MitigationReplace dynamic SQL queries with parameterized queries (prepared statements) in edit_profile.php for the txtRetailerAddress parameter, and implement proper input validation.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.

NVD · CPE data
Supplier Management SystemApplication
Affected:= 1.0

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Privileges
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Verify the application version
    Locate and examine the Campcodes Supplier Management System installation. Check for version identification files, about pages, or headers that indicate the installed version is exactly 1.0
    Affected if The installed version is Campcodes Supplier Management System 1.0
  2. Confirm the vulnerable file exists
    Check if the file /retailer/edit_profile.php exists within the web application's document root directory
    Affected if The file /retailer/edit_profile.php is present in the installation
  3. Inspect the SQL query implementation
    Examine the edit_profile.php file source code. Look for SQL query statements that incorporate the txtRetailerAddress parameter without using prepared statements or parameter binding
    Affected if The code contains SQL queries that directly concatenate the txtRetailerAddress parameter without sanitization or parameterized queries
  4. Check if retailer profile editing is accessible
    Verify that the retailer profile editing functionality is enabled and accessible to users, typically at /retailer/edit_profile.php or similar endpoint
    Affected if The profile editing feature is enabled and reachable in the application

A user is affected if they are running Campcodes Supplier Management System version 1.0 with the edit_profile.php file present and the retailer profile editing feature accessible, where the txtRetailerAddress parameter is handled via direct SQL concatenation rather than parameterized queries.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

From vendor data
Mitigation available No clean upgrade yet — mitigate in the meantime
Mitigation

Replace dynamic SQL queries with parameterized queries (prepared statements) in edit_profile.php for the txtRetailerAddress parameter, and implement proper input validation.

Fix this in Supplier Management System Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation2.0 h
  • Implementation4.0 h
  • Testing3.0 h
  • Review / QA2.0 h
11.0 hours of engineering $1,930
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Scan for this in your stack

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dbcve dependency scanner

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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-0597 in production — separate from our analysis above.

No notes yet

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What this is

A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.

What belongs here
  • Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
  • No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
  • No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data