CVE-2026-2474
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedCrypt::URandom versions from 0.41 before 0.55 for Perl is vulnerable to a heap buffer overflow in the XS function crypt_urandom_getrandom(). The function does not validate that the length parameter is non-negative. If a negative value (e.g. -1) is supplied, the expression length + 1u causes an integer wraparound, resulting in a zero-byte allocation. The subsequent call to getrandom(data, length, GRND_NONBLOCK) passes the original negative value, which is implicitly converted to a large unsigned value (typically SIZE_MAX). This can result in writes beyond the allocated buffer, leading to heap memory corruption and application crash (denial of service). In common usage, the length argument is typically hardcoded by the caller, which reduces the likelihood of attacker-controlled exploitation. Applications that pass untrusted input to this parameter may be affected.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceCrypt::URandom versions 0.41-0.55 have a heap buffer overflow in crypt_urandom_getrandom() where missing validation of negative length parameters causes integer wraparound (length+1u = 0) during allocation, then getrandom() receives the negative value converted to SIZE_MAX, resulting in writes beyond the allocated buffer and heap corruption.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data>= 0.41, < 0.55CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Check if Crypt::URandom module is installedRun `perl -MCrypt::URandom -e 'print $Crypt::URandom::VERSION'` or check your Perl environment's module listAffected if The module is not installed
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Determine the installed version of Crypt::URandomExtract the version number from the output of the perl command above or from your dependency manifest (cpanfile, Makefile.PL, or similar)Affected if The version cannot be determined or the module is not present
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Compare version to affected rangeCheck if the installed version falls within >= 0.41 and < 0.55Affected if Installed version is 0.41, 0.42, 0.43, 0.44, 0.45, 0.46, 0.47, 0.48, 0.49, 0.50, 0.51, 0.52, 0.53, or 0.54
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Audit code calling crypt_urandom_getrandomSearch your codebase for calls to functions that ultimately invoke crypt_urandom_getrandom() and inspect whether any caller-provided length arguments could be negativeAffected if Code paths exist that can pass negative length values to the vulnerable function
Your environment is affected if Crypt::URandom version is 0.41 through 0.55 and code can invoke crypt_urandom_getrandom() with a negative length parameter.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scoped0.55
Upgrade Crypt::URandom to version 0.55 or later. As a defense-in-depth measure, validate that any caller-provided length values are non-negative before passing to this function.
Crypt::URandom version 0.55
- Check the currently installed version of Crypt::URandom by running: cpan -D Crypt::URandom or perl -MCrypt::URandom -e 'print $Crypt::URandom::VERSION'
- Upgrade to version 0.55 or later using your preferred Perl package manager. For cpan: cpan> install Crypt::URandom. For cpanm: cpanm Crypt::URandom. Alternatively, force upgrade to specific version: cpanm Crypt::[email protected]
- Verify the upgrade was successful by checking the new version: perl -MCrypt::URandom -e 'print $Crypt::URandom::VERSION'
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation2.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $2,752.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-2474 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-2474 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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