CVE-2026-26334
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedCalero VeraSMART versions prior to 2026 R1 contain hardcoded static AES encryption keys within Veramark.Framework.dll (Veramark.Core.Config class). These keys are used to encrypt the password of the service account stored in C:\\VeraSMART Data\\app.settings. An attacker with local access to the system can extract the hardcoded keys from the Veramark.Framework.dll module and decrypt the stored credentials. The recovered credentials can then be used to authenticate to the Windows host, potentially resulting in local privilege escalation depending on the privileges of the configured service account.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceCalero VeraSMART versions prior to 2026 R1 contain hardcoded static AES encryption keys embedded in the Veramark.Framework.dll assembly (specifically the Veramark.Core.Config class). These keys are used to encrypt service account passwords stored in the app.settings configuration file. An attacker with local system access can reverse-engineer the DLL to extract the hardcoded keys and decrypt the stored credentials, potentially achieving local privilege escalation.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data< 2026.0= 2026.0CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify installed VeraSMART versionLocate the VeraSMART installation directory and check the version from the installer, application metadata, or product information file. Common paths include C:\Program Files\Calero\VeraSMART or the installation root directory.Affected if The installed version is less than 2026.0 or equals 2026.0, as these versions contain the hardcoded AES keys.
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Locate Veramark.Framework.dllSearch for Veramark.Framework.dll in the VeraSMART installation directory, typically under the bin or application subfolder.Affected if The DLL exists in the installation directory, indicating the vulnerable component is present.
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Verify app.settings contains encrypted credentialsOpen the app.settings configuration file in the VeraSMART configuration directory and look for encrypted or encoded password fields, typically under a section containing service account or credential configurations.Affected if The app.settings file contains encrypted password values, which are encrypted using the hardcoded keys.
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Confirm hardcoded keys in DLLInspect Veramark.Framework.dll using a .NET decompiler (such as ILSpy or dnSpy) and locate the Veramark.Core.Config class to identify hardcoded AES encryption keys or initialization vectors.Affected if Hardcoded AES keys or IVs are found embedded in the Veramark.Core.Config class within the DLL.
A system is affected if it runs VeraSMART version 2026.0 or any version prior to 2026 R1, since these contain the hardcoded AES keys that can decrypt stored service account credentials.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scoped2026.0
Upgrade to VeraSMART 2026 R1 or later which should remove the hardcoded keys. Additionally, rotate the service account credentials and implement proper external key management rather than hardcoding keys in the application binary.
VeraSMART 2026 R1
- 1. Identify the current installed version of Calero VeraSMART
- 2. Schedule a maintenance window for the upgrade
- 3. Backup the VeraSMART database and configuration files, particularly C:\VeraSMART Data\app.settings
- 4. Download Calero VeraSMART 2026 R1 from the official Calero support portal
- 5. Run the installer and follow the vendor's upgrade procedure
- 6. After upgrade, verify the Veramark.Framework.dll no longer contains hardcoded AES keys
- 7. As a security precaution, change the service account password used by VeraSMART since it may have been exposed
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation12.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA3.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-26334 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-26334 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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