VerasmartApplication · Calero

CVE-2026-26334

HIGH · 7.8 CVSS v3.1 Published 2026-02-13
Fix available
A fix is available. Upgrade to 2026.0 or later.
See remediation →
80/100
Remediation priority · High
Zero-click

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
Calero VeraSMART versions prior to 2026 R1 contain hardcoded static AES encryption keys within Veramark.Framework.dll (Veramark.Core.Config class). These keys are used to encrypt the password of the service account stored in C:\\VeraSMART Data\\app.settings. An attacker with local access to the system can extract the hardcoded keys from the Veramark.Framework.dll module and decrypt the stored credentials. The recovered credentials can then be used to authenticate to the Windows host, potentially resulting in local privilege escalation depending on the privileges of the configured service account.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · high confidence

Calero VeraSMART versions prior to 2026 R1 contain hardcoded static AES encryption keys embedded in the Veramark.Framework.dll assembly (specifically the Veramark.Core.Config class). These keys are used to encrypt service account passwords stored in the app.settings configuration file. An attacker with local system access can reverse-engineer the DLL to extract the hardcoded keys and decrypt the stored credentials, potentially achieving local privilege escalation.

MitigationUpgrade to VeraSMART 2026 R1 or later which should remove the hardcoded keys. Additionally, rotate the service account credentials and implement proper external key management rather than hardcoding keys in the application binary.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.

NVD · CPE data
VerasmartApplication
Affected:< 2026.0= 2026.0

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Local
Complexity
Low
Privileges
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Identify installed VeraSMART version
    Locate the VeraSMART installation directory and check the version from the installer, application metadata, or product information file. Common paths include C:\Program Files\Calero\VeraSMART or the installation root directory.
    Affected if The installed version is less than 2026.0 or equals 2026.0, as these versions contain the hardcoded AES keys.
  2. Locate Veramark.Framework.dll
    Search for Veramark.Framework.dll in the VeraSMART installation directory, typically under the bin or application subfolder.
    Affected if The DLL exists in the installation directory, indicating the vulnerable component is present.
  3. Verify app.settings contains encrypted credentials
    Open the app.settings configuration file in the VeraSMART configuration directory and look for encrypted or encoded password fields, typically under a section containing service account or credential configurations.
    Affected if The app.settings file contains encrypted password values, which are encrypted using the hardcoded keys.
  4. Confirm hardcoded keys in DLL
    Inspect Veramark.Framework.dll using a .NET decompiler (such as ILSpy or dnSpy) and locate the Veramark.Core.Config class to identify hardcoded AES encryption keys or initialization vectors.
    Affected if Hardcoded AES keys or IVs are found embedded in the Veramark.Core.Config class within the DLL.

A system is affected if it runs VeraSMART version 2026.0 or any version prior to 2026 R1, since these contain the hardcoded AES keys that can decrypt stored service account credentials.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

dbcve · scoped
Upgrade available Upgrade to 2026.0 or later
Fixed in 2026.0
Interim mitigation

Upgrade to VeraSMART 2026 R1 or later which should remove the hardcoded keys. Additionally, rotate the service account credentials and implement proper external key management rather than hardcoding keys in the application binary.

Recommended fix High confidence

VeraSMART 2026 R1

  1. 1. Identify the current installed version of Calero VeraSMART
  2. 2. Schedule a maintenance window for the upgrade
  3. 3. Backup the VeraSMART database and configuration files, particularly C:\VeraSMART Data\app.settings
  4. 4. Download Calero VeraSMART 2026 R1 from the official Calero support portal
  5. 5. Run the installer and follow the vendor's upgrade procedure
  6. 6. After upgrade, verify the Veramark.Framework.dll no longer contains hardcoded AES keys
  7. 7. As a security precaution, change the service account password used by VeraSMART since it may have been exposed

Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.

Fix this in Verasmart Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation4.0 h
  • Implementation12.0 h
  • Testing6.0 h
  • Review / QA3.0 h
25.0 hours of engineering $4,400
Get the upgrade done

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Scan for this in your stack

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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-26334 in production — separate from our analysis above.

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What this is

A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.

What belongs here
  • Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
  • No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
  • No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data