CVE-2026-26335
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedCalero VeraSMART versions prior to 2022 R1 use static ASP.NET/IIS machineKey values configured for the VeraSMART web application and stored in C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Veramark\\VeraSMART\\WebRoot\\web.config. An attacker who obtains these keys can craft a valid ASP.NET ViewState payload that passes integrity validation and is accepted by the application, resulting in server-side deserialization and remote code execution in the context of the IIS application.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceCalero VeraSMART uses hardcoded static machineKey values in its web.config file. An attacker who obtains these keys (e.g., through file access or configuration backup compromise) can forge malicious ASP.NET ViewState payloads that pass integrity validation, triggering insecure deserialization and achieving remote code execution in the IIS application pool context.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data< 2022.0= 2022.0CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Locate the VeraSMART web.config fileFind the web.config file in the Calero VeraSMART installation directory, typically in the web root of the IIS applicationAffected if The file contains a <machineKey> element with hardcoded validationKey and decryptionKey values that appear static or identical across installations
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Inspect the machineKey configurationOpen the web.config file and examine the <machineKey> section for the validationKey and decryptionKey attributes; note any values that are hardcoded rather than generated uniquelyAffected if Static, hardcoded key values are present in the configuration - these keys would be the same across any VeraSMART installation using the affected version
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Determine the installed VeraSMART versionCheck the version of Calero VeraSMART installed in the environment; this may be visible in the application itself, in installation files, or in the web.config assembly version informationAffected if The installed version is prior to 2022.0 or exactly equals 2022.0 (versions < 2022.0 or = 2022.0 are affected)
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Verify ViewState validation is enabledConfirm that the application uses ASP.NET ViewState validation; this is typically enabled by default when the application runs under ASP.NET with ViewState MAC validation turned on (enableViewStateMac attribute in web.config)Affected if ViewState validation is enabled in the application configuration, which allows the hardcoded machineKey to be exploited for forging malicious ViewState payloads
A user is affected if they are running Calero VeraSMART version 2022.0 or earlier AND their web.config file contains static hardcoded machineKey values that could be obtained by an attacker to forge ViewState payloads.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scoped2022.0
Generate new unique machineKey values (validationKey and decryptionKey) using cryptographically secure random generators and update web.config; also upgrade to version 2022 R1 or later if a patched version is available.
Calero VeraSMART 2022 R1 or later
- Identify current Calero VeraSMART version by checking the About section in the application or reviewing the installation directory
- Download Calero VeraSMART version 2022 R1 or later from the official Calero vendor website
- Backup the existing VeraSMART installation, including the database and configuration files
- Before upgrading, obtain new machineKey values - either generate new keys or use the ones provided in the 2022 R1 release notes
- If using the new keys from the vendor, replace the static machineKey values in C:\Program Files (x86)\Veramark\VeraSMART\WebRoot\web.config with the new secure values
- Alternatively, generate new ASP.NET machineKey values using a cryptographically secure random generator and update web.config accordingly
- Stop the IIS site or application pool for VeraSMART before making changes
- Apply the upgrade following Calero's official upgrade documentation
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation3.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-26335 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-26335 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data