CVE-2026-27174
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedMajorDoMo (aka Major Domestic Module) allows unauthenticated remote code execution via the admin panel's PHP console feature. An include order bug in modules/panel.class.php causes execution to continue past a redirect() call that lacks an exit statement, allowing unauthenticated requests to reach the ajax handler in inc_panel_ajax.php. The console handler within that file passes user-supplied input from GET parameters (via register_globals) directly to eval() without any authentication check. An attacker can execute arbitrary PHP code by sending a crafted GET request to /admin.php with ajax_panel, op, and command parameters.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceMajorDoMo contains an unauthenticated RCE vulnerability where a missing exit statement after a redirect() call in modules/panel.class.php allows unauthenticated requests to bypass authentication and reach the ajax handler in inc_panel_ajax.php. This handler directly passes user-supplied GET parameters to PHP's eval() function without any authentication, enabling arbitrary code execution.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE dataall versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Locate MajorDoMo installationSearch for the presence of modules/panel.class.php or inc_panel_ajax.php files in your web directory, which are core components of the MajorDoMo application.Affected if Either file exists in your web root or accessible directories, indicating a MajorDoMo installation.
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Verify ajax handler fileExamine the inc_panel_ajax.php file for direct usage of eval() function with $_GET or $_REQUEST superglobals.Affected if The file contains eval() calls that incorporate unsanitized GET parameters, enabling arbitrary code execution.
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Check authentication bypass in panel.class.phpReview modules/panel.class.php for redirect() calls that are not followed by an exit or die statement.Affected if A redirect() call exists without a subsequent exit(), allowing unauthenticated requests to continue execution past the authentication block.
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Determine if panel is accessible without authenticationTest whether the ajax handler can be reached via HTTP requests without providing valid credentials, by attempting requests to inc_panel_ajax.php with arbitrary eval() payloads in GET parameters.Affected if The handler executes eval() on GET parameters without requiring authentication, confirming the vulnerability is exploitable.
Your environment is affected if MajorDoMo is installed and the inc_panel_ajax.php file uses eval() with GET parameters while remaining accessible without authentication due to the missing exit after redirect().
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedFix the redirect() function to terminate execution after sending the header, add proper authentication checks to the ajax handler, and remove or properly sandbox the dangerous eval() usage with user input.
- 1. Navigate to the vendor patch URL: https://github.com/sergejey/majordomo/pull/1177
- 2. Review the changes introduced in the pull request to understand the fix
- 3. Apply the patch changes to your local Majordomo installation, specifically addressing the include order issue in modules/panel.class.php
- 4. Ensure the redirect() calls in the code include exit statements to prevent code execution after redirection
- 5. Verify that the ajax handler in inc_panel_ajax.php properly validates authentication before processing console commands
- 6. After applying the patch, test that unauthenticated requests to /admin.php with ajax_panel, op, and command parameters are properly rejected
- 7. Confirm that legitimate console functionality still works after the fix
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation3.0 h
- Implementation6.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-27174 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-27174 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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