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MajordomoApplication · Mjdm

CVE-2026-27180

CRITICAL · 9.8 CVSS v3.1 Published 2026-02-18
Patch available
A vendor patch is available. No clean upgrade release — apply the published patch.
See remediation →
100/100
Remediation priority · Urgent
Public exploit Remotely reachable No privileges Zero-click Patch available

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
MajorDoMo (aka Major Domestic Module) is vulnerable to unauthenticated remote code execution through supply chain compromise via update URL poisoning. The saverestore module exposes its admin() method through the /objects/?module=saverestore endpoint without authentication because it uses gr('mode') (which reads directly from $_REQUEST) instead of the framework's $this->mode. An attacker can poison the system update URL via the auto_update_settings mode handler, then trigger the force_update handler to initiate the update chain. The autoUpdateSystem() method fetches an Atom feed from the attacker-controlled URL with trivial validation, downloads a tarball via curl with TLS verification disabled (CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYPEER set to FALSE), extracts it using exec('tar xzvf ...'), and copies all extracted files to the document root using copyTree(). This allows an attacker to deploy arbitrary PHP files, including webshells, to the webroot with two GET requests.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · high confidence

MajorDoMo suffers from unauthenticated RCE via the saverestore module which exposes its admin() method through /objects/?module=saverestore without authentication, using gr('mode') instead of the framework's $this->mode. Attackers poison the update URL via auto_update_settings, then trigger force_update to fetch and extract a malicious tarball from an attacker-controlled URL with TLS verification disabled, deploying arbitrary PHP webshells to the webroot.

MitigationImmediately restrict access to the saverestore module with proper authentication, replace gr('mode') with $this->mode, enable TLS certificate verification, and validate update sources before fetching.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.

NVD · CPE data
MajordomoApplication
Affected:all versions

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Privileges
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Check if saverestore module is exposed without authentication
    Attempt to access /objects/?module=saverestore via HTTP request (e.g., curl -s http://TARGET/objects/?module=saverestore). If the page loads without requiring login credentials, the module is exposed.
    Affected if The endpoint responds with content (not a redirect to login or 403) and allows unauthenticated access to the saverestore functionality.
  2. Inspect auto_update_settings configuration
    Locate and read the MajorDoMo configuration file where auto_update_settings are stored (typically in the database or a config file). Look for the 'update_url' or similar field that defines where updates are fetched from.
    Affected if The update URL is set to an untrusted or attacker-controlled domain, or is set to an unexpected/unknown value.
  3. Verify TLS certificate verification status for updates
    Search the codebase or configuration for the update mechanism (likely in saverestore module or update-related code). Look for occurrences of disabling TLS verification such as 'CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYPEER' set to 0, 'ssl_verify_peer' => false, or similar.
    Affected if TLS/SSL certificate verification is explicitly disabled for the update fetch operation.
  4. Search webroot for unexpected PHP files
    List all PHP files in the web document root (e.g., find /var/www -name '*.php' or similar). Compare against expected legitimate PHP files from a clean MajorDoMo installation.
    Affected if There are PHP files in the webroot that were not part of the original installation, especially files with names like shell.php, cmd.php, or other suspicious filenames.
  5. Check server logs for force_update or saverestore activity
    Review web server access logs (apache2 access log, nginx access log) for requests to /objects/?module=saverestore with mode=force_update or similar update-triggering parameters.
    Affected if Logs show requests to the saverestore module with force_update mode from IP addresses that are not trusted admin sources.

You are affected if the saverestore module is accessible without authentication AND (the update URL points to an untrusted source OR TLS verification is disabled), or if unexpected PHP webshell files exist in your webroot.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

dbcve · scoped
Patch available Apply the vendor patch
Vendor patch github.com →
Interim mitigation

Immediately restrict access to the saverestore module with proper authentication, replace gr('mode') with $this->mode, enable TLS certificate verification, and validate update sources before fetching.

Recommended fix High confidence
  1. 1. Review the vendor patch at https://github.com/sergejey/majordomo/pull/1177 to understand the code changes
  2. 2. Apply the patch to your MajorDoMo installation, which should address the authentication bypass in saverestore module
  3. 3. Ensure the fix properly validates the mode parameter using $this->mode instead of directly reading from $_REQUEST via gr('mode')
  4. 4. Verify the patch also addresses the insecure TLS verification (CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYPEER=FALSE) in autoUpdateSystem()
  5. 5. After patching, test that the /objects/?module=saverestore endpoint requires authentication
  6. 6. Validate that the auto_update_settings mode handler now properly authenticates before allowing update URL modifications
  7. 7. Confirm the force_update handler requires proper authorization

Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.

Fix this in Majordomo Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation4.0 h
  • Implementation8.0 h
  • Testing6.0 h
  • Review / QA3.0 h
21.0 hours of engineering $3,680
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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-27180 in production — separate from our analysis above.

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What this is

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What belongs here
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  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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