Build Of Apache Camel HawtioWeb server / proxy · Redhat

CVE-2026-28369

CRITICAL · 9.1 CVSS v3.1 Published 2026-03-27
Mitigation only
No fix yet — a mitigation exists. There is no fixed release. A documented workaround reduces exposure in the meantime.
See remediation →
100/100
Remediation priority · Urgent
Remotely reachable No privileges Zero-click

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
A flaw was found in Undertow. When Undertow receives an HTTP request where the first header line starts with one or more spaces, it incorrectly processes the request by stripping these leading spaces. This behavior, which violates HTTP standards, can be exploited by a remote attacker to perform request smuggling. Request smuggling allows an attacker to bypass security mechanisms, access restricted information, or manipulate web caches, potentially leading to unauthorized actions or data exposure.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · moderate confidence

Undertow incorrectly strips leading spaces from the first header line of HTTP requests, violating HTTP standards. This parsing flaw allows request smuggling attacks where attackers can bypass security controls, access restricted resources, or manipulate web caches by crafting requests with leading spaces in headers.

MitigationUpdate Undertow to the patched version once available, or implement a reverse proxy in front of Undertow that normalizes HTTP requests by rejecting or properly handling requests with non-standard leading spaces in headers.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.

NVD · CPE data
Build Of Apache Camel HawtioWeb server / proxy
Affected:= 4.0
Build Of Apache Camel For Spring BootWeb server / proxy
Affected:= 4.0
Data GridApplication
Affected:= 8.0
FuseApplication
Affected:= 7.0.0
Jboss Enterprise Application PlatformApplication
Affected:= 7.0.0= 8.0.0
Jboss Enterprise Application Platform Expansion PackApplication
Affected:all versions
Process AutomationApplication
Affected:= 7.0
Single Sign OnApplication
Affected:= 7.0

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Privileges
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
None

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Identify Undertow usage
    Determine if your application runs on JBoss Enterprise Application Platform, WildFly, Red Hat Fuse, or other Red Hat products that embed Undertow as their HTTP server. Check product documentation or examine runtime dependencies for undertow-core jar files.
    Affected if Your environment uses any of the affected Red Hat products listed (JBoss EAP 7.0/8.0, Fuse 7.0.0, Data Grid 8.0, Process Automation 7.0, Single Sign On 7.0, or Camel/Hawtio 4.0) as the Undertow server.
  2. Confirm Undertow version
    Locate the undertow-core jar file in your deployment (typically under $JBOSS_HOME/modules/system/layers/base/io/undertow/ or within application WAR/lib folders). Check the version from the filename or manifest. Compare against known affected Undertow versions that contain the parsing flaw.
    Affected if The Undertow version in use predates the patched release that properly rejects leading whitespace in HTTP header lines.
  3. Inspect HTTP request handling configuration
    Review undertow subsystem configuration in standalone.xml or standalone-full.xml (look for <http-listener>, <ajp-listener>, or <https-listener> elements). Check for any custom parser settings related to header processing.
    Affected if Default Undertow configuration is in use without modifications to strict HTTP parsing behavior.
  4. Test for request smuggling vulnerability
    Send a crafted HTTP request with a leading space in the first header line (e.g., ' GET / HTTP/1.1' as the first line with a leading space) to your server endpoint. Compare the response behavior against upstream proxy handling of the same request.
    Affected if The server accepts the request with leading whitespace instead of rejecting it with a 400 Bad Request, indicating the parsing flaw is present.
  5. Review access logs for anomalous requests
    Examine undertow access logs for entries containing header lines that start with space characters. Look for patterns that suggestsmuggling attempts or inconsistent parsing between proxies and backend.
    Affected if Log entries show requests with non-standard leading whitespace in headers that were processed without rejection.

You are affected if your deployment uses any of the listed Red Hat products with embedded Undertow that does not reject HTTP requests with leading spaces in header lines, allowing potential request smuggling.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

dbcve · scoped
Mitigation available No clean upgrade yet — mitigate in the meantime
Mitigation

Update Undertow to the patched version once available, or implement a reverse proxy in front of Undertow that normalizes HTTP requests by rejecting or properly handling requests with non-standard leading spaces in headers.

Recommended fix Moderate confidence
  1. Check the Red Hat Security Advisory (RHSA) for CVE-2026-28369 via access.redhat.com/security/cve/ or bugzilla.redhat.com to obtain the specific patch package name and version
  2. Apply the appropriate Undertow security update to your Red Hat Enterprise Application Platform, JBoss, or Fuse installation using your system's package manager (e.g., yum update or dnf update)
  3. Restart the affected JBoss/WildFly or Undertow services to apply the patched Undertow libraries
  4. Verify the patch was applied by checking the Undertow version (e.g., rpm -q jboss-*) and confirm the security fix is loaded
  5. Test that HTTP requests with leading spaces in header lines are now properly rejected according to HTTP specification

Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.

Fix this in Build Of Apache Camel Hawtio Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation3.0 h
  • Implementation8.0 h
  • Testing4.0 h
  • Review / QA3.0 h
18.0 hours of engineering $3,180
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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-28369 in production — separate from our analysis above.

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What this is

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What belongs here
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  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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