CVE-2026-30910
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedCrypt::Sodium::XS versions through 0.001000 for Perl has potential integer overflows. Combined aead encryption, combined signature creation, and bin2hex functions do not check that output size will be less than SIZE_MAX, which could lead to integer wraparound causing an undersized output buffer. This can cause a crash in bin2hex and encryption algorithms other than aes256gcm. For aes256gcm encryption and signatures, an undersized buffer could lead to buffer overflow. Encountering this issue is unlikely as the message length would need to be very large. For bin2hex the input size would have to be > SIZE_MAX / 2 For aegis encryption the input size would need to be > SIZE_MAX - 32U For other encryption the input size would need to be > SIZE_MAX - 16U For signatures the input size would need to be > SIZE_MAX - 64U
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe Crypt::Sodium::XS Perl library versions through 0.001000 contain integer overflow vulnerabilities in its combined AEAD encryption, signature creation, and bin2hex functions. These functions fail to validate that calculated output sizes won't exceed SIZE_MAX, causing integer wraparound that results in undersized buffers. This leads to crashes in bin2hex and non-aes256gcm encryption, while aes256gcm encryption and signatures could experience buffer overflows when processing messages exceeding SIZE_MAX minus overhead thresholds.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data<= 0.001001CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify Crypt::Sodium::XS installation and versionRun 'perl -MCrypt::Sodium::XS -e "print $Crypt::Sodium::XS::VERSION"' or check via 'cpan -l | grep Crypt::Sodium::XS'Affected if Version is 0.001000 or lower, or any version <= 0.001001 per product listing
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Verify bin2hex function usageSearch codebase for calls to bin2hex or 'Crypt::Sodium::XS::bin2hex'Affected if bin2hex is used to convert buffers larger than SIZE_MAX/2 (approximately 4GB on 64-bit systems)
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Identify AEAD encryption mode in useSearch for aegis256, aegis128, or other AEAD cipher calls in code using Crypt::Sodium::XSAffected if AEGIS encryption is used with messages exceeding SIZE_MAX-32 bytes
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Check for non-aes256gcm encryption usageSearch for secretbox, chacha20poly1305, or other non-GCM encryption calls from the libraryAffected if These encryption modes process messages larger than SIZE_MAX-16 bytes
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Detect signature function usageSearch for sign, signature creation, or related functions from Crypt::Sodium::XSAffected if Signature functions process messages exceeding SIZE_MAX-64 bytes
User is affected if Crypt::Sodium::XS version 0.001001 or lower is installed AND any of the vulnerable functions (bin2hex, AEAD encryption, other encryption, or signatures) process messages approaching SIZE_MAX thresholds.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataUpgrade to a patched version of Crypt::Sodium::XS that properly validates buffer sizes before arithmetic operations, or implement application-layer input validation to reject messages exceeding safe size thresholds (SIZE_MAX/2 for bin2hex, SIZE_MAX-32U for aegis, SIZE_MAX-16U for other encryption, SIZE_MAX-64U for signatures).
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation3.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-30910 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-30910 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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