CVE-2026-33707
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedChamilo LMS is a learning management system. Prior to 1.11.38 and 2.0.0-RC.3, the default password reset mechanism generates tokens using sha1($email) with no random component, no expiration, and no rate limiting. An attacker who knows a user's email can compute the reset token and change the victim's password without authentication. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.11.38 and 2.0.0-RC.3.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceChamilo LMS versions prior to 1.11.38 and 2.0.0-RC3 use a deterministic sha1($email) hash as the password reset token. Since the token is derived solely from the user's email address with no randomness, no expiration, and no rate limiting, any attacker who knows a victim's email can compute the exact reset token and change the password without authentication.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data< 1.11.38= 2.0.0CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify installed Chamilo LMS versionCheck the version file or admin panel for the current Chamilo LMS version numberAffected if Version is below 1.11.38 or equals 2.0.0 (including 2.0.0-RC3)
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Locate password reset token generation codeSearch the source code for the password reset or password recovery functionality, typically in a file related to user authentication or password managementAffected if The code uses sha1($email) or similar deterministic hash of the email address as the reset token
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Verify token contains randomnessExamine the token generation logic to determine if any random or unique value (such as a random string, timestamp with salt, or cryptographically secure random bytes) is incorporated into the tokenAffected if No random component is used; token is derived solely from the email address or other static user data
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Confirm token expiration is implementedLook for token expiration logic, such as a timestamp check or time-based validity period in the password reset flowAffected if No expiration mechanism exists; tokens remain valid indefinitely
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Check for rate limiting on password resetInspect the web server or application configuration for rate limiting rules on the password reset endpointAffected if No rate limiting is present on password reset requests
You are affected if your Chamilo LMS version is below 1.11.38 or equals 2.0.0 AND the password reset token is generated using a deterministic method (sha1 of email) without randomness or expiration.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scoped1.11.38
Upgrade to Chamilo LMS version 1.11.38 or 2.0.0-RC3 or later, which implements proper random token generation with expiration. Consider adding rate limiting and monitoring for anomalous password reset requests as additional defensive measures.
1.11.38 (or 2.0.0-RC.3 for 2.x branch)
- 1. Create a full backup of the database and all Chamilo LMS files
- 2. Download Chamilo LMS version 1.11.38 (or 2.0.0-RC.3 for the 2.x branch) from the official repository
- 3. Replace the existing Chamilo installation files with the new version
- 4. Run any database migration scripts included in the upgrade
- 5. Clear any cached data
- 6. Verify the application is functioning correctly
- 7. Test the password reset functionality to confirm the vulnerability is patched
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $5,120.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-33707 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-33707 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data