CVE-2026-3561
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedPhilips Hue Bridge hk_hap characteristics Heap-based Buffer Overflow Remote Code Execution Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows network-adjacent attackers to execute arbitrary code on affected installations of Philips Hue Bridge. Although authentication is required to exploit this vulnerability, the existing authentication mechanism can be bypassed. The specific flaw exists within the handling of PUT requests to the characteristics endpoint. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of the length of user-supplied data prior to copying it to a heap-based buffer. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to execute code in the context of the device. Was ZDI-CAN-28479.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceHeap-based buffer overflow vulnerability in Philips Hue Bridge's hk_hap characteristics handler. The flaw exists in the PUT request processing to the characteristics endpoint where user-supplied data length is not validated before being copied to a heap-based buffer. While authentication is required, it can be bypassed, allowing network-adjacent attackers to achieve RCE in the device context.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data< 1975170000CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Adjacent
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.0/AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify the device as Philips Hue Bridge V2Access the Philips Hue Bridge web interface (typically at the device's IP address) and check the device model information, or query the Hue API at /api/config endpointAffected if The device is confirmed to be a Philips Hue Bridge V2 model
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Check the installed firmware versionIn the Hue Bridge web interface, navigate to Settings > Bridge > General Information to view the firmware version, or query the /api/config endpoint and locate the 'apiversion' or 'swversion' fieldAffected if The firmware version is less than 1975170000
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Verify hk_hap characteristics endpoint is accessibleSend a PUT request to the characteristics endpoint (typically /api/v2/characteristics or similar path exposed by the Hue Bridge's HomeKit HAP implementation). Use an HTTP client to send a raw PUT request with JSON body to the Bridge's IP on port 80/443Affected if The endpoint accepts PUT requests and returns a response (even an error response indicates the endpoint exists and is reachable)
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Check network accessibility of the BridgeDetermine if the Philips Hue Bridge is deployed on a network segment accessible to untrusted users or guests. Verify by checking the network topology and ACLs that separate the Bridge from external or untrusted network segmentsAffected if The Bridge is on a shared or untrusted network segment without network isolation from potential adjacent attackers
You are affected if you have a Philips Hue Bridge V2 with firmware version below 1975170000 that is network-accessible to untrusted users, as the vulnerability can be exploited via the hk_hap characteristics endpoint despite authentication requirements.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor data1975170000
Apply vendor-provided firmware patches when available; until then, isolate the Philips Hue Bridge on a restricted network segment to limit exposure to adjacent attackers and monitor for unauthorized access attempts.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation2.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA3.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-3561 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-3561 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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