CVE-2026-3562
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedPhilips Hue Bridge hk_hap Ed25519 Signature Verification Authentication Bypass Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows network-adjacent attackers to execute arbitrary code on affected installations of Philips Hue Bridge. Authentication is not required to exploit this vulnerability. The specific flaw exists within the ed25519_sign_open function. The issue results from improper verification of a cryptographic signature. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to bypass authentication on the system. Was ZDI-CAN-28480.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe Philips Hue Bridge contains an authentication bypass vulnerability in its hk_hap implementation's Ed25519 signature verification. The flaw in the ed25519_sign_open function allows improper cryptographic signature verification, enabling network-adjacent attackers to bypass authentication completely and execute arbitrary code without any credentials.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data< 1975170000CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Adjacent
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify Philips Hue Bridge V2 on your networkLocate the Philips Hue Bridge device on your network and confirm it is the V2 model (circular shape with the Philips logo). Check the device label or your Hue app for the model identifier.Affected if You have a Philips Hue Bridge V2 device on your network
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Check the installed firmware versionOpen the Philips Hue app, go to Settings > Hue Bridges, select your bridge, and note the firmware version displayed. Alternatively, access the bridge's web interface and check the version information.Affected if The firmware version is less than 1975170000
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Verify network accessibility of the bridgeConfirm the Hue Bridge is reachable on your network. Check if the bridge's IP address responds to ping or HTTP requests on ports 80 or 443. The vulnerability is exploitable by network-adjacent attackers.Affected if The bridge is accessible on an untrusted or shared network segment
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Confirm hk_hap feature is enabledThe vulnerability exists in the hk_hap implementation using Ed25519 for authentication. Verify that your Hue Bridge has the Hue API accessible over the network (typically port 80/443). This is the standard configuration for Hue app connectivity.Affected if The bridge API is exposed on the network with hk_hap authentication enabled
You are affected if you have a Philips Hue Bridge V2 running firmware version below 1975170000 that is accessible on a network where untrusted actors can reach it.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scoped1975170000
Apply the vendor-supplied firmware update for Philips Hue Bridge when available. As a compensating control, isolate the device on a restricted network segment to limit exposure to network-adjacent attackers.
Firmware version 1975170000 or later
- Open the Philips Hue app and navigate to Settings > Hue Bridges
- Tap on the specific Hue Bridge V2 device
- Select 'Firmware update' or check for available updates
- If an update is available, ensure the bridge is powered on and connected to the network, then proceed with the installation
- Verify the firmware version after update reaches or exceeds 1975170000
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation3.0 h
- Implementation2.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-3562 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-3562 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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