CVE-2026-40010
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedMissing invocation of Servlet http web request method changeSessionId after session binding can be exploited for a session fixation attack in Apache Wicket. This issue affects Apache Wicket: from 8.0.0 through 8.17.0, 9.0.0, from 10.0.0 through 10.8.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 10.9.0, which fixes the issue.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceApache Wicket fails to invoke HttpServletRequest.changeSessionId() after session binding during authentication, allowing attackers to pre-set session IDs and hijack authenticated sessions (session fixation).
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data>= 8.0.0, <= 8.17.0>= 9.0.0, <= 9.22.0>= 10.0.0, < 10.9.0CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify Apache Wicket versionLocate the wicket-core JAR file in your application dependencies (Maven pom.xml, Gradle build.gradle, or the deployed lib directory) and note the version numberAffected if The installed version falls within 8.0.0-8.17.0, 9.0.0-9.22.0, or 10.0.0-10.8.x (any version below 10.9.0)
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Confirm session-based authentication is in useReview your application code to determine if user authentication creates or binds to an HTTP session (look for session.setAttribute() calls after login, or Session.get() usage in authentication handlers)Affected if Your application creates and binds user authentication state to an HTTP session after login
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Check for session ID regeneration after authenticationSearch codebase for explicit calls to request.changeSessionId() or HttpServletRequest.changeSessionId() occurring after login/authentication logicAffected if No such calls exist - the session ID is not being regenerated after user authentication
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Review session configurationInspect your application's web.xml or servlet container configuration for session settings, and check if SessionFixationProtectionSessionStore is configured in your Wicket applicationAffected if Session fixation protection is not explicitly enabled in Wicket configuration
Your environment is affected if you run Apache Wicket below version 10.9.0 and your application uses session-based authentication without explicit session ID regeneration after login.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scoped10.9.0
Upgrade Apache Wicket to version 10.9.0 or later which implements the required changeSessionId() call after session binding.
Upgrade to Apache Wicket 10.9.0 (for 10.x branch) or latest 8.17.x/9.22.x stable release for respective branches
- Identify your current Apache Wicket version from your project's pom.xml or build.gradle dependency declaration
- Update the Wicket dependency version to 10.9.0 (for 10.x branch users) or to the latest 8.x/9.x stable release that includes the fix
- Run mvn clean compile or gradle build to verify the upgrade compiles successfully
- Review release notes for any migration considerations between your current and target version
- Test application functionality, particularly session handling and authentication flows, to ensure no regressions
- Deploy to staging environment and perform security validation before production release
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation2.0 h
- Testing8.0 h
- Review / QA3.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-40010 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-40010 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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