CVE-2026-40084
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedCacti is an open source performance and fault management framework. Versions 1.2.30 and prior are vulnerable to Path Traversal through the Report format_file Parameter, causing arbitrary file read. This vulnerability occurs in two stages. In the first stage (stored injection), lib/html_reports.php at line 283 stores $save['format_file'] = $post['format_file'] directly into the database without any validation. In the second stage (file read), lib/reports.php at line 667 concatenates CACTI_PATH_FORMATS . '/' . $format_file, and line 670 then calls file($format_file), reading arbitrary files from the filesystem. This issue has been fixed in version 1.2.31.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysisA file path is built from user input without being confined, so sequences like “../” let an attacker step outside the intended directory. That can expose configuration, credentials, or source code, and in the worst case lets an attacker write files where they shouldn't. A durable fix resolves and canonicalises the path, then rejects anything that escapes a known-safe base directory.
General guidance for the path traversal class — the official description and references above are authoritative for this specific CVE. Want a bespoke review and a reviewed fix? Ask our team →
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data< 1.2.31CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scoped1.2.31
1.2.31
- 1. Backup the Cacti database using mysqldump or your preferred backup method
- 2. Backup the entire Cacti web root directory and configuration files (include/config.php)
- 3. Download Cacti version 1.2.31 from the official Cacti website or GitHub releases
- 4. Extract the new version files to a temporary directory
- 5. Copy the new Cacti files over the existing installation, preserving your config.php and any custom resource files
- 6. Run the Cacti upgrade script if required (typically via browser at https://your-cacti-url/install/)
- 7. Clear any caching mechanisms (if using plugins like Cache or similar)
- 8. Verify the upgrade by logging into Cacti and checking the version number
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-40084 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-40084 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data