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ActivemqApplication · Apache

CVE-2026-41044

HIGH · 8.8 CVSS v3.1 Published 2026-04-24
Fix available
A fix is available. Upgrade to 5.19.6 / 6.2.5 or later.
See remediation →
94/100
Remediation priority · Urgent
Remotely reachable Zero-click

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
Improper Input Validation, Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection') vulnerability in Apache ActiveMQ, Apache ActiveMQ Broker, Apache ActiveMQ All. An authenticated attacker can use the admin web console page to construct a malicious broker name that bypasses name validation to include an xbean binding that can be later used by a VM transport to load a remote Spring XML application. The attacker can then use the DestinationView mbean to send a message to trigger a VM transport creation that will reference this malicious broker name which can lead to loading the malicious Spring XML context file. Because Spring's ResourceXmlApplicationContext instantiates all singleton beans before the BrokerService validates the configuration, arbitrary code execution occurs on the broker's JVM through bean factory methods such as Runtime.exec(). This issue affects Apache ActiveMQ: before 5.19.6, from 6.0.0 before 6.2.5; Apache ActiveMQ Broker: before 5.19.6, from 6.0.0 before 6.2.5; Apache ActiveMQ All: before 5.19.6, from 6.0.0 before 6.2.5. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 6.2.5 or 5.19.6, which fixes the issue.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · high confidence

Authenticated attacker injects malicious broker name with xbean binding via admin console, which gets loaded through VM transport to load a remote Spring XML context. Spring's ResourceXmlApplicationContext instantiates singleton beans before BrokerService validates, enabling arbitrary code execution via Runtime.exec().

MitigationUpgrade to Apache ActiveMQ version 5.19.6 or 6.2.5 to resolve the input validation and code injection vulnerability.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.

NVD · CPE data
ActivemqApplication
Affected:< 5.19.6>= 6.0.0, < 6.2.5
Activemq BrokerApplication
Affected:< 5.19.6>= 6.0.0, < 6.2.5

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Privileges
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Identify ActiveMQ version
    Check the lib/activemq-core.jar manifest or run: java -jar lib/activemq-core.jar --version. Alternatively, check conf/activemq.xml for version comments or inspect the installation directory for version files.
    Affected if Version is < 5.19.6 OR (>= 6.0.0 AND < 6.2.5)
  2. Verify admin web console is enabled
    Inspect conf/activemq.xml for a web console servlet configuration. Look for a <web> element or servlet mapping to /admin. Also check if the jetty.xml configuration file includes admin console bean definitions.
    Affected if Admin web console is accessible without additional restrictions
  3. Confirm VM transport is in use
    Search conf/activemq.xml for 'vm://' transport connectors. Also check for any embed-brokers using the VM transport protocol in the configuration.
    Affected if VM transport connectors are defined in the broker configuration
  4. Check for broker name configuration
    Inspect conf/activemq.xml for <broker> elements with a 'brokerName' attribute. Default is 'localhost'. Verify if the broker name contains any xbean-style bindings or unusual characters.
    Affected if Broker name accepts arbitrary string input through admin console API
  5. Verify authentication is required for admin console
    Check conf/jetty-realm.properties for user definitions. Confirm that the admin console requires valid credentials by testing access or reviewing security constraint configurations in jetty.xml.
    Affected if Admin console is accessible without authentication or uses weak/default credentials

Environment is affected if ActiveMQ version falls within the vulnerable range AND the admin web console is accessible with valid credentials, allowing a user to modify broker names that get processed by the VM transport.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

dbcve · scoped
Upgrade available Upgrade to 5.19.6 / 6.2.5 or later
Fixed in 5.19.66.2.5
Interim mitigation

Upgrade to Apache ActiveMQ version 5.19.6 or 6.2.5 to resolve the input validation and code injection vulnerability.

Recommended fix High confidence

5.19.6 or 6.2.5

  1. 1. Backup your current ActiveMQ configuration, data directory, and any custom XML configuration files.
  2. 2. Stop the running ActiveMQ broker gracefully.
  3. 3. Download the fixed release: choose version 5.19.6 if on the 5.x branch, or version 6.2.5 if on the 6.x branch.
  4. 4. Extract the new ActiveMQ distribution to your installation directory.
  5. 5. Restore your configuration from the backup (ensure any custom broker name configurations do not contain malicious xbean bindings).
  6. 6. Start the upgraded ActiveMQ broker and verify it runs without errors.
  7. 7. Verify the version number matches the expected fixed release (5.19.6 or 6.2.5).
  8. 8. Test that the admin web console and message broker functionality work normally.
Caveat Review release notes for breaking changes between your current version and the target fixed version; minor upgrades typically have minimal compatibility issues

Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.

Fix this in Activemq Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation3.0 h
  • Implementation4.0 h
  • Testing4.0 h
  • Review / QA2.0 h
13.0 hours of engineering $2,280
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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-41044 in production — separate from our analysis above.

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What this is

A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.

What belongs here
  • Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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