CVE-2026-41635
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedApache MINA's AbstractIoBuffer.resolveClass() contains two branches, one of them (for static classes or primitive types) does not check the class at all, bypassing the classname allowlist and allowing arbitrary code to be executed. The fix checks if the class is present in the accepted class filter before calling Class.forName(). Affected versions are Apache MINA 2.0.0 <= 2.0.27, 2.1.0 <= 2.1.10, and 2.2.0 <= 2.2.5. The problem is resolved in Apache MINA 2.0.28, 2.1.11, and 2.2.6 by applying the classname allowlist earlier. Affected are applications using Apache MINA that call IoBuffer.getObject(). Applications using Apache MINA are advised to upgrade.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceApache MINA's AbstractIoBuffer.resolveClass() has a deserialization flaw where the branch handling static classes and primitive types bypasses the classname allowlist entirely, enabling arbitrary code execution via Class.forName() without validation. An attacker can exploit IoBuffer.getObject() to deserialize malicious objects.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data>= 2.0.0, < 2.0.28>= 2.1.0, < 2.1.11>= 2.2.0, < 2.2.6CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify Apache MINA versionCheck the mina-core.jar manifest, or inspect pom.xml/gradle build files for the mina-core dependency version, or run: jar -xf mina-core.jar META-INF/MANIFEST.MF && cat META-INF/MANIFEST.MFAffected if The version falls within < 2.0.28, >= 2.0.0; or < 2.1.11, >= 2.1.0; or < 2.2.6, >= 2.2.0
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Locate IoBuffer.getObject() usageSearch source code for calls to IoBuffer.getObject() or AbstractIoBuffer.getObject() method invocations, or grep -r 'getObject' across the codebaseAffected if The application calls getObject() on IoBuffer instances to deserialize Java objects
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Determine data source trustworthinessTrace the source of data passed to IoBuffer.wrap() or IoBuffer.flip() before getObject() is called; check if it originates from network sockets, uploaded files, or other untrusted external inputsAffected if The deserialized data originates from untrusted or attacker-controlled sources such as network connections or user uploads
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Verify allowlist configuration (if any)Search for any custom ObjectInputStream subclass, ClassResolver configuration, or allowlist implementation that may have been added around the getObject() callAffected if No custom classname allowlist or validation is implemented before the getObject() call, and the code relies on the default MINA deserialization
You are affected if your Apache MINA version is below the fixed releases AND your application uses IoBuffer.getObject() to deserialize objects from untrusted sources without any custom allowlist validation.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scoped2.0.282.1.112.2.6
Upgrade Apache MINA to version 2.0.28, 2.1.11, or 2.2.6 (or later) to apply the classname allowlist check before Class.forName() is called.
Apache MINA 2.0.28, 2.1.11, or 2.2.6 (depending on current version branch)
- Identify the current Apache MINA version in use by checking project dependencies (Maven pom.xml, Gradle build.gradle, or JAR manifest)
- Determine which version branch is currently in use (2.0.x, 2.1.x, or 2.2.x)
- Upgrade to the fixed version for that branch: 2.0.28 if on 2.0.x, 2.1.11 if on 2.1.x, or 2.2.6 if on 2.2.x
- Update the dependency in build configuration (Maven: <version>org.apache.mina:mina-core:VERSION</version> or Gradle: implementation 'org.apache.mina:mina-core:VERSION')
- Rebuild and redeploy the application
- Verify the application functions correctly after upgrade
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation1.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-41635 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-41635 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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