CVE-2026-47065
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedZDRES-232: resolveProxyClass Not Overridden - acceptMatchers Filter Bypass via java.lang.reflect.Proxy Assessment: Fully addressed. When the serialised stream contains a TC_PROXYCLASSDESC (the marker for a java.lang.reflect.Proxy ), JDK’s ObjectInputStream.readProxyDesc() is dispatched. JDK then calls the default ObjectInputStream.resolveProxyClass(interfaces) implementation, which performs Class.forName(intf, false, latestUserDefinedLoader()) for EACH interface name and constructs the proxy class — bypassing the accepted classes list . ZDRES-233: Class.forName(name, initialize=true, classLoader) in readClassDescriptor Triggers Static Initialiser of Allow-Listed Classes Assessment: Fully addressed. For ANY class on the allow-list, deserialising a stream that names it triggers the class’s (static initialiser) BEFORE any instance is constructed. This means an attacker who supplies a class name on the allow-list (e.g., the developer wrote accept(“com.myapp.*") , attacker supplies com.myapp.SomeClass ) causes <clinit> of SomeClass — and many real-world classes have side-effecting static initialisers Both issues have been fixed.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceTwo Java deserialization vulnerabilities in ObjectInputStream: (1) resolveProxyClass not overridden allows Proxy class instantiation to bypass acceptMatchers filter via Class.forName with latestUserDefinedLoader, and (2) Class.forName with initialize=true in readClassDescriptor triggers static initializers of allow-listed classes before instance construction, enabling side-effects from <clinit> blocks.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 2.0.29= 2.1.13= 2.2.8CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify Apache Mina installationSearch for Mina JAR files (e.g., mina-core-*.jar) or Maven/Gradle dependencies containing 'org.apache.mina' in your classpath, application directory, or deployed librariesAffected if Apache Mina version 2.0.29, 2.1.13, or 2.2.8 is found in the environment
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Check application for Java deserializationSearch codebase for ObjectInputStream usage or any custom deserialization logic that processes Java objects from untrusted sources, particularly in code that integrates with Apache MinaAffected if ObjectInputStream or custom deserialization handlers are used to process external data through Mina
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Inspect custom ObjectDeserializer implementationsReview any custom ObjectInputStream subclass or ObjectDeserializer implementations that handle TC_PROXYCLASSDESC or readClassDescriptor calls in Mina-based communicationAffected if Custom deserialization code exists that does not override resolveProxyClass() or readClassDescriptor() to validate against acceptMatchers allow-lists
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Verify deserialization filter configurationExamine if ObjectInputFilter or similar JVM-level deserialization filters are configured, and whether they explicitly validate proxy classes and class descriptorsAffected if No custom filter validation exists for proxy classes and class descriptors, or filters rely solely on Mina's default behavior
You are affected if Apache Mina versions 2.0.29, 2.1.13, or 2.2.8 are in use and your application deserializes Java objects from untrusted sources without custom resolveProxyClass and readClassDescriptor validation.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataBoth vulnerabilities have been addressed in the codebase. For existing deployments, verify the fix is properly applied and conduct regression testing to ensure the deserialization allow-list functions as intended without triggering unintended class initializers.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-47065 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-47065 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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