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ActivemqApplication · Apache

CVE-2026-42588

HIGH · 8.1 CVSS v3.1 Published 2026-06-01
Fix available
A fix is available. Upgrade to 5.19.7 / 6.2.6 or later.
See remediation →
87/100
Remediation priority · High
Remotely reachable Zero-click

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
Improper Input Validation, Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection') vulnerability in Apache ActiveMQ Broker, Apache ActiveMQ All, Apache ActiveMQ. Apache ActiveMQ Classic exposes the Jolokia JMX-HTTP bridge at /api/jolokia/ on the web console. The default Jolokia access policy permits exec operations on all ActiveMQ MBeans (org.apache.activemq:*), including BrokerService.addNetworkConnector(String). An authenticated attacker can invoke these operations with a crafted discovery URI that triggers the VM transport's brokerConfig parameter using the "masterslave:// " URL which can allow loading a Spring XML application context using ResourceXmlApplicationContext. Because Spring's ResourceXmlApplicationContext instantiates all singleton beans before the BrokerService validates the configuration, arbitrary code execution occurs on the broker's JVM through bean factory methods such as Runtime.exec(). This issue affects Apache ActiveMQ Broker: before 5.19.7, from 6.0.0 before 6.2.6; Apache ActiveMQ All: before 5.19.7, from 6.0.0 before 6.2.6; Apache ActiveMQ: before 5.19.7, from 6.0.0 before 6.2.6. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 5.19.7 or 6.2.6, which fixes the issue.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · high confidence

Apache ActiveMQ Classic exposes the Jolokia JMX-HTTP bridge at /api/jolokia/ which permits exec operations on ActiveMQ MBeans. An authenticated attacker can invoke BrokerService.addNetworkConnector() with a crafted 'masterslave://' discovery URI that triggers VM transport's brokerConfig parameter to load a Spring XML application context via ResourceXmlApplicationContext. Since singleton beans are instantiated before BrokerService validates the configuration, arbitrary code execution occurs through bean factory methods like Runtime.exec().

MitigationUpgrade Apache ActiveMQ to version 5.19.7 or 6.2.6 which contains the fix for this code injection vulnerability.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.

NVD · CPE data
ActivemqApplication
Affected:< 5.19.7>= 6.0.0, < 6.2.6
Activemq BrokerApplication
Affected:< 5.19.7>= 6.0.0, < 6.2.6

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Privileges
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
None

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Check ActiveMQ version
    Locate the ActiveMQ installation and run: for 5.x check 'activemq --version' or look at lib/activemq-all-*.jar filename; for 6.x check the version file or pom.xml in the installation directory
    Affected if The installed version is below 5.19.7 or is 6.0.0 through 6.2.5
  2. Verify Jolokia HTTP endpoint exposure
    Check web server configuration files (jetty.xml or conf/jetty*.xml) for a Jolokia servlet mapping at /api/jolokia/ or attempt a local HTTP request to http://localhost:8161/api/jolokia/
    Affected if The Jolokia endpoint is exposed and accessible over HTTP without network restrictions
  3. Confirm Jolokia authentication status
    Review the security constraint in jetty.xml for the /api/jolokia/ path - check for a constraint-name and associated login-config; attempt an unauthenticated request to the Jolokia endpoint
    Affected if The Jolokia endpoint allows unauthenticated or weakly authenticated access
  4. Check if JMX/RMI network connector invocation is possible
    Review whether the ActiveMQ user account used for Jolokia has permissions to invoke 'addNetworkConnector' on the BrokerService MBean; check jmx.access and jmx.password files for role permissions
    Affected if A user with permissions to invoke BrokerService operations via Jolokia exists and can be leveraged

You are affected if your ActiveMQ version is below 5.19.7 or between 6.0.0 and 6.2.5 AND the Jolokia endpoint at /api/jolokia/ is accessible with sufficient permissions to invoke BrokerService.addNetworkConnector.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

dbcve · scoped
Upgrade available Upgrade to 5.19.7 / 6.2.6 or later
Fixed in 5.19.76.2.6
Interim mitigation

Upgrade Apache ActiveMQ to version 5.19.7 or 6.2.6 which contains the fix for this code injection vulnerability.

Recommended fix High confidence

Upgrade to Apache ActiveMQ 5.19.7 (for 5.x line) or 6.2.6 (for 6.x line)

  1. 1. Determine the currently installed ActiveMQ version by checking the version file or startup logs
  2. 2. Identify which major version line (5.x or 6.x) is currently in use
  3. 3. For ActiveMQ 5.x users: Download Apache ActiveMQ 5.19.7 from the official Apache archives
  4. 4. For ActiveMQ 6.x users: Download Apache ActiveMQ 6.2.6 from the official Apache archives
  5. 5. Stop the ActiveMQ broker gracefully (using bin/activemq stop or equivalent)
  6. 6. Back up the entire existing ActiveMQ installation directory and configuration files
  7. 7. Extract the new version to the target installation location
  8. 8. Restore custom configurations from the backup (activemq.xml, login.config, etc.)
Caveat Review release notes for any breaking changes between current and target version; test configurations in non-production first

Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.

Fix this in Activemq Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation3.0 h
  • Implementation4.0 h
  • Testing6.0 h
  • Review / QA2.0 h
15.0 hours of engineering $2,580
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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-42588 in production — separate from our analysis above.

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What this is

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What belongs here
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  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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