CVE-2026-43327
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: USB: dummy-hcd: Fix locking/synchronization error Syzbot testing was able to provoke an addressing exception and crash in the usb_gadget_udc_reset() routine in drivers/usb/gadgets/udc/core.c, resulting from the fact that the routine was called with a second ("driver") argument of NULL. The bad caller was set_link_state() in dummy_hcd.c, and the problem arose because of a race between a USB reset and driver unbind. These sorts of races were not supposed to be possible; commit 7dbd8f4cabd9 ("USB: dummy-hcd: Fix erroneous synchronization change"), along with a few followup commits, was written specifically to prevent them. As it turns out, there are (at least) two errors remaining in the code. Another patch will address the second error; this one is concerned with the first. The error responsible for the syzbot crash occurred because the stop_activity() routine will sometimes drop and then re-acquire the dum->lock spinlock. A call to stop_activity() occurs in set_link_state() when handling an emulated USB reset, after the test of dum->ints_enabled and before the increment of dum->callback_usage. This allowed another thread (doing a driver unbind) to sneak in and grab the spinlock, and then clear dum->ints_enabled and dum->driver. Normally this other thread would have to wait for dum->callback_usage to go down to 0 before it would clear dum->driver, but in this case it didn't have to wait since dum->callback_usage had not yet been incremented. The fix is to increment dum->callback_usage _before_ calling stop_activity() instead of after. Then the thread doing the unbind will not clear dum->driver until after the call to usb_gadget_udc_reset() safely returns and dum->callback_usage has been decremented again.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysisShared resources are accessed without correct locking, so concurrent operations interleave into inconsistent — and sometimes exploitable — states, or deadlock the service outright. These bugs are subtle and timing-dependent. The fix is correct, consistent locking or atomic operations around every shared resource.
General guidance for the improper locking class — the official description and references above are authoritative for this specific CVE. Want a bespoke review and a reviewed fix? Ask our team →
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data>= 3.2.97, < 3.3>= 3.16.52, < 3.17>= 4.1.46, < 4.2>= 4.4.92, < 4.5>= 4.9.55, < 4.10>= 4.14, < 5.10.253>= 5.11, < 5.15.203>= 5.16, < 6.1.168>= 6.2, < 6.6.134>= 6.7, < 6.12.81>= 6.13, < 6.18.22>= 6.19, < 6.19.12CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scoped3.33.174.2
Upgrade to kernel 3.3+ (for 3.2.x), 3.17+ (for 3.16.x), 4.2+ (for 4.1.x), 4.5+ (for 4.4.x), or preferably a modern stable kernel (5.x/6.x)
- 1. Identify the currently running Linux kernel version using `uname -r`
- 2. Determine which version branch your kernel derives from (3.2.x, 3.16.x, 4.1.x, or 4.4.x)
- 3. Plan an upgrade to a fixed version: 3.3+ for 3.2.x kernels, 3.17+ for 3.16.x kernels, 4.2+ for 4.1.x kernels, or 4.5+ for 4.4.x kernels
- 4. For production systems, prefer upgrading to a modern stable kernel (5.x LTS or 6.x) rather than the minimum fixed version to receive broader security updates
- 5. Before upgrading, review the kernel configuration, especially USB gadget configuration (`CONFIG_USB_GADGET`, `CONFIG_USB_DUMMY_HCD`), to ensure compatibility
- 6. Test the kernel upgrade in a non-production environment first
- 7. Apply the upgrade using your distribution's package manager or by building from kernel.org sources
- 8. Reboot into the new kernel and verify the system boots without errors
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-43327 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-43327 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
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