CVE-2026-4800
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedImpact: The fix for CVE-2021-23337 (https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-35jh-r3h4-6jhm) added validation for the variable option in _.template but did not apply the same validation to options.imports key names. Both paths flow into the same Function() constructor sink. When an application passes untrusted input as options.imports key names, an attacker can inject default-parameter expressions that execute arbitrary code at template compilation time. Additionally, _.template uses assignInWith to merge imports, which enumerates inherited properties via for..in. If Object.prototype has been polluted by any other vector, the polluted keys are copied into the imports object and passed to Function(). Patches: Users should upgrade to version 4.18.0. Workarounds: Do not pass untrusted input as key names in options.imports. Only use developer-controlled, static key names.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceLodash _.template has a code injection vulnerability where options.imports key names are not validated before being passed to the Function() constructor. Attackers can inject default-parameter expressions to achieve arbitrary code execution at template compilation time. Additionally, assignInWith's use of for..in enumeration allows Object.prototype pollution to be leveraged for exploitation.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data>= 4.0.0, < 4.18.0>= 4.0.0, < 4.18.0>= 4.0.0, < 4.18.0>= 4.0.0, < 4.18.0CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
-
Check installed Lodash versionRun `npm list lodash` or inspect your package.json dependencies to identify the exact version of Lodash installedAffected if The version is >= 4.0.0 and < 4.18.0
-
Identify Lodash package variantCheck which Lodash variant is in use (lodash, lodash-amd, lodash-es, or lodash.template) by examining your package.json import/require statementsAffected if Any of these variants are present at version < 4.18.0
-
Detect _.template usage with options.importsSearch your codebase for usages of `_.template` or `template` that pass an options object containing an `imports` key, for example: `_.template(str, { imports: { ... } })`Affected if User-controlled or untrusted input is used as key names within the options.imports object
-
Detect assignInWith usageSearch your codebase for usages of `_.assignInWith` or `assignInWith` that merge user-controlled objects into a target objectAffected if Untrusted or user-controlled objects are passed as sources to assignInWith, which could enable Object.prototype pollution
You are affected if your installed Lodash version is >= 4.0.0 and < 4.18.0 AND you use _.template with untrusted options.imports key names OR assignInWith with untrusted source objects.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scoped4.18.0
Upgrade to Lodash version 4.18.0 or later. As a defensive measure, never pass untrusted input as key names in options.imports—only use developer-controlled, static key names.
[email protected] (and lodash-amd, lodash-es, lodash.template at version 4.18.0)
- Identify all project dependencies that include lodash (e.g., lodash, lodash-amd, lodash-es, lodash.template) using npm ls lodash or equivalent package manager command
- Update lodash to version 4.18.0 by running: npm install [email protected] (or yarn add [email protected] / pnpm add [email protected])
- If using bundler-level lodash imports (e.g., lodash-amd, lodash-es), update those packages similarly to their 4.18.0 versions
- Re-run application tests to verify template functionality works as expected
- If your application uses options.imports in _.template, audit the code to ensure key names are developer-controlled static values rather than user-supplied input
- Rebuild and deploy the updated application
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation2.0 h
- Testing8.0 h
- Review / QA4.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $4,928.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-4800 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sources- github.com
- cna.openjsf.org
- github.com
- github.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- bugzilla.redhat.com
- security.access.redhat.com
- nvd.nist.gov
Practitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-4800 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
Be the first to add a field note for this CVE — a mitigation you’ve verified, a version caveat, or a link to a working fix. Sign in above to contribute.
A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data