CVE-2026-52994
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vsock/virtio: fix MSG_ZEROCOPY pinned-pages accounting virtio_transport_init_zcopy_skb() uses iter->count as the size argument for msg_zerocopy_realloc(), which in turn passes it to mm_account_pinned_pages() for RLIMIT_MEMLOCK accounting. However, this function is called after virtio_transport_fill_skb() has already consumed the iterator via __zerocopy_sg_from_iter(), so on the last skb, iter->count will be 0, skipping the RLIMIT_MEMLOCK enforcement. Pass pkt_len (the total bytes being sent) as an explicit parameter to virtio_transport_init_zcopy_skb() instead of reading the already-consumed iter->count. This matches TCP and UDP, which both call msg_zerocopy_realloc() with the original message size.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe vsock/virtio transport in the Linux kernel fails to properly enforce RLIMIT_MEMLOCK during MSG_ZEROCOPY operations. After virtio_transport_fill_skb() consumes the iterator via __zerocopy_sg_from_iter(), subsequent calls to virtio_transport_init_zcopy_skb() read iter->count which becomes 0 on the last skb, causing memory pinning accounting to be skipped entirely. This allows local users to bypass memory locking limits.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data>= 6.7, < 6.18.33>= 6.19, < 7.0.10CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Check the running kernel versionRun 'uname -r' or 'cat /proc/version' to get the kernel versionAffected if The version is >= 6.7 and < 6.18.33, or >= 6.19 and < 7.0.10
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Verify vsock/virtio transport is in useCheck for loaded vsock modules with 'lsmod | grep vsock' or check for vsock device nodes in /dev or /sys/class/vsockAffected if vsock modules are loaded or vsock devices exist in the environment
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Confirm MSG_ZEROCOPY capability is activeCheck if the kernel supports zerocopy by looking for CONFIG_ZEROCOPY in /boot/config-$(uname -r) or check socket options with 'ss -zerocopy'Affected if Zerocopy support is compiled in and available for vsock sockets
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Inspect current RLIMIT_MEMLOCK settingsRun 'ulimit -l' or 'cat /proc/self/limits' to see the current memory lock limitsAffected if RLIMIT_MEMLOCK is set to a finite value (not unlimited) - this indicates the bypass could allow exceeding this limit
A system is affected if it runs a vulnerable kernel version (6.7 to 6.18.32, 6.19 to 7.0.9) with vsock/virtio transport and zerocopy support enabled, allowing local users to exceed their RLIMIT_MEMLOCK when using MSG_ZEROCOPY with vsock.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scoped6.18.337.0.10
Apply the upstream kernel patch to pass pkt_len (total bytes being sent) as an explicit parameter to virtio_transport_init_zcopy_skb() instead of relying on the consumed iter->count, matching TCP/UDP behavior.
Linux Kernel 6.18.33 or later, or 7.0.10 or later
- Identify the current running Linux kernel version using 'uname -r'
- Upgrade the Linux kernel to version 6.18.33 or later for the 6.x branch, or version 7.0.10 or later for the 7.x branch
- Reboot the system to load the fixed kernel
- Verify the fix is applied by checking the kernel version and reviewing the git commit for virtio_transport_init_zcopy_skb changes
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation1.0 h
- Implementation2.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $1,952.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-52994 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-52994 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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