CVE-2026-53034
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf, sockmap: Fix af_unix null-ptr-deref in proto update unix_stream_connect() sets sk_state (`WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_state, TCP_ESTABLISHED)`) _before_ it assigns a peer (`unix_peer(sk) = newsk`). sk_state == TCP_ESTABLISHED makes sock_map_sk_state_allowed() believe that socket is properly set up, which would include having a defined peer. IOW, there's a window when unix_stream_bpf_update_proto() can be called on socket which still has unix_peer(sk) == NULL. CPU0 bpf CPU1 connect -------- ------------ WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_state, TCP_ESTABLISHED) sock_map_sk_state_allowed(sk) ... sk_pair = unix_peer(sk) sock_hold(sk_pair) sock_hold(newsk) smp_mb__after_atomic() unix_peer(sk) = newsk BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000080 RIP: 0010:unix_stream_bpf_update_proto+0xa0/0x1b0 Call Trace: sock_map_link+0x564/0x8b0 sock_map_update_common+0x6e/0x340 sock_map_update_elem_sys+0x17d/0x240 __sys_bpf+0x26db/0x3250 __x64_sys_bpf+0x21/0x30 do_syscall_64+0x6b/0x3a0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Initial idea was to move peer assignment _before_ the sk_state update[1], but that involved an additional memory barrier, and changing the hot path was rejected. Then a NULL check during proto update in unix_stream_bpf_update_proto() was considered[2], but the follow-up discussion[3] focused on the root cause, i.e. sockmap update taking a wrong lock. Or, more specifically, missing unix_state_lock()[4]. In the end it was concluded that teaching sockmap about the af_unix locking would be unnecessarily complex[5]. Complexity aside, since BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS and BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT are allowed to update sockmaps, sock_map_update_elem() taking the unix lock, as it is currently implemented in unix_state_lock(): spin_lock(&unix_sk(s)->lock), would be problematic. unix_state_lock() taken in a process context, followed by a softirq-context TC BPF program attempting to take the same spinlock -- deadlock[6]. This way we circled back to the peer check idea[2]. [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/[email protected]/ [2]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/[email protected]/ [3]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/[email protected]/ [4]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CAAVpQUA+8GL_j63CaKb8hbxoL21izD58yr1NvhOhU=j+35+3og@mail.gmail.com/ [5]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAAVpQUAHijOMext28Gi10dSLuMzGYh+jK61Ujn+fZ-wvcODR2A@mail.gmail.com/ [6]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]/ Summary of scenarios where af_unix/stream connect() may race a sockmap update: 1. connect() vs. bpf(BPF_MAP_UPDATE_ELEM), i.e. sock_map_update_elem_sys() Implemented NULL check is sufficient. Once assigned, socket peer won't be released until socket fd is released. And that's not an issue because sock_map_update_elem_sys() bumps fd refcnf. 2. connect() vs BPF program doing update Update restricted per verifier.c:may_update_sockmap() to BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING/BPF_TRACE_ITER BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCK_OPS (bpf_sock_map_update() only) BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_REUSEPORT BPF_PROG_TYPE_FLOW_DISSECTOR BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_LOOKUP Plus one more race to consider: CPU0 bpf CPU1 connect -------- ------------ WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_state, TCP_ESTABLISHED) sock_map_sk_state_allowed(sk) sock_hold(newsk) smp_mb__after_atomic() ---truncated---
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · low confidenceAffected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data>= 5.15, < 6.1.175>= 6.2, < 6.6.141>= 6.7, < 6.12.91>= 6.13, < 6.18.33>= 6.19, < 7.0.10CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scoped6.1.1756.6.1416.12.91
6.1.175, 6.6.141, 6.12.91, or 6.18.33 (select based on your current kernel branch)
- Determine the current kernel version using `uname -r`
- Identify which version branch you're running (e.g., 5.15.x, 6.2.x, 6.7.x, or 6.13.x)
- Upgrade to a fixed kernel version: for 5.15/6.1 branch upgrade to >=6.1.175; for 6.2-6.6 branch upgrade to >=6.6.141; for 6.7-6.12 branch upgrade to >=6.12.91; for 6.13-6.18 branch upgrade to >=6.18.33
- Reboot the system to load the new kernel
- Verify the fix by checking the kernel version with `uname -r`
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-53034 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-53034 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
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