CVE-2026-53124
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ublk: reset per-IO canceled flag on each fetch If a ublk server starts recovering devices but dies before issuing fetch commands for all IOs, cancellation of the fetch commands that were successfully issued may never complete. This is because the per-IO canceled flag can remain set even after the fetch for that IO has been submitted - the per-IO canceled flags for all IOs in a queue are reset together only once all IOs for that queue have been fetched. So if a nonempty proper subset of the IOs for a queue are fetched when the ublk server dies, the IOs in that subset will never successfully be canceled, as their canceled flags remain set, and this prevents ublk_cancel_cmd from actually calling io_uring_cmd_done on the commands, despite the fact that they are outstanding. Fix this by resetting the per-IO cancel flags immediately when each IO is fetched instead of waiting for all IOs for the queue (which may never happen).
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceIn the Linux kernel's ublk (user block device) subsystem, a race condition exists where per-IO canceled flags are only reset after all IOs in a queue are fetched together. If the ublk server dies during recovery after only a subset of IOs are fetched, those fetched IOs retain their canceled flags, preventing ublk_cancel_cmd from calling io_uring_cmd_done to complete the commands.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data>= 6.14.6, < 6.15>= 6.15.1, < 7.0.10= 6.15CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
-
Check kernel version against affected rangesRun `uname -r` or `cat /proc/version` and compare the version to: >= 6.14.6, < 6.15; >= 6.15.1, < 7.0.10; = 6.15Affected if Kernel version falls within any of the affected version ranges
-
Verify ublk subsystem is loaded or compiled inCheck if ublk module is loaded with `lsmod | grep ublk` or look for ublk in kernel config at `/boot/config-$(uname -r)`Affected if The ublk module is loaded or compiled into the running kernel
-
Check for active ublk device instancesList ublk device files with `ls -la /dev/ublk* 2>/dev/null` or check `/sys/kernel/debug/ublk/` for active devicesAffected if One or more ublk devices exist and are configured
-
Review system logs for ublk server failures during recoverySearch kernel logs with `dmesg | grep -i ublk` or check `/var/log/syslog` for ublk server crash messages occurring during device recovery operationsAffected if Logs show ublk server failures during recovery while running an affected kernel version
A system is affected only if it runs an affected kernel version AND uses the ublk subsystem with active devices, particularly if ublk server failures during recovery have been observed in logs.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scoped6.157.0.10
Apply the kernel patch that resets per-IO cancel flags immediately upon each individual IO fetch. This is a kernel-level fix requiring a code change and kernel upgrade or vendor patch application.
Linux Kernel >= 7.0.10
- Update the Linux kernel to version 7.0.10 or later using your distribution's package manager or kernel upgrade procedure
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing12.0 h
- Review / QA6.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $8,192.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-53124 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-53124 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
Be the first to add a field note for this CVE — a mitigation you’ve verified, a version caveat, or a link to a working fix. Sign in above to contribute.
A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data