VulnerabilityAwaiting classification

CVE-2026-63975

HIGH · 8.8 CVSS v3.1 Published 2026-07-19
Mitigation only
No fix yet — a mitigation exists. There is no fixed release. A documented workaround reduces exposure in the meantime.
See remediation →
93/100
Remediation priority · Urgent
No privileges Zero-click 5 weeks old

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix possible crash on l2cap_ecred_conn_rsp If dcid is received for an already-assigned destination CID the spec requires that both channels to be discarded, but calling l2cap_chan_del may invalidate the tmp cursor created by list_for_each_entry_safe and in fact it is the wrong procedure as the chan->dcid may be assigned previously it really needs to be disconnected. Calling l2cap_chan_clone directly may still lead to l2cap_chan_del so instead schedule l2cap_chan_timeout with delay 0 to close the channel asynchronously.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · high confidence

A crash occurs in l2cap_ecred_conn_rsp when processing a destination CID (dcid) for an already-assigned channel. The l2cap_chan_del function invalidates the list iterator used by list_for_each_entry_safe, causing a use-after-free or crash. The fix replaces direct channel deletion with scheduling l2cap_chan_timeout with delay 0 for asynchronous channel closure.

MitigationApply the Linux kernel patch that modifies l2cap_ecred_conn_rsp to schedule asynchronous channel closure via l2cap_chan_timeout instead of calling l2cap_chan_del directly.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Adjacent
Complexity
Low
Privileges
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Check kernel version
    Run `uname -r` to get the running kernel version. Compare it to the version that includes the fix for this CVE (typically kernel 6.x.y where y is after the patch date, or check your distribution's security advisories)
    Affected if Running a kernel version older than the patched version that contains the l2cap ECRED fix
  2. Verify Bluetooth kernel module is loaded
    Run `lsmod | grep bluetooth` or `modinfo bluetooth` to check if the Bluetooth core module is loaded
    Affected if Bluetooth module is loaded - the vulnerability exists in the L2CAP Bluetooth subystem
  3. Check if L2CAP protocol is active
    Run `rfcomm -a` or check /proc/bluetooth/ for active L2CAP channels. Also check `hciconfig -a` to see if any Bluetooth adapters are up
    Affected if Any Bluetooth adapter is up and L2CAP connections are in use - the vulnerable code path is exercised when ECRED connection responses are processed
  4. Confirm ECRED connection handling is in use
    L2CAP ECRED (Enhanced Credit Based) is used for Bluetooth LE connections. Check active connections via `btmon` log or check /sys/kernel/debug/bluetooth/hci* for connection details
    Affected if Bluetooth LE or Classic connections using L2CAP ECRED are active - the specific code path handling ECRED connection responses is triggered

A system is affected if it runs a vulnerable Linux kernel version AND has Bluetooth enabled with L2CAP ECRED connections in use, as the crash occurs when processing an already-assigned destination CID in the ECRED connection response handler.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

From vendor data
Mitigation available No clean upgrade yet — mitigate in the meantime
Mitigation

Apply the Linux kernel patch that modifies l2cap_ecred_conn_rsp to schedule asynchronous channel closure via l2cap_chan_timeout instead of calling l2cap_chan_del directly.

Have this fixed Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation1.0 h
  • Implementation3.0 h
  • Testing4.0 h
  • Review / QA2.0 h
10.0 hours of engineering $1,700
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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-63975 in production — separate from our analysis above.

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What this is

A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.

What belongs here
  • Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
  • No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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