The TeleMessage service through 2025-05-05 implements authentication through a long-lived credential (e.g., not a token with a short expiration time)…
The TeleMessage service through 2025-05-05 relies on MD5 for password hashing, which opens up various attack possibilities (including rainbow tables)…
The TeleMessage service through 2025-05-05 stores certain cleartext information in memory, even though memory content may be accessible to an adversa…
The TeleMessage service through 2025-05-05 relies on the client side (e.g., the TM SGNL app) to do MD5 hashing, and then accepts the hash as the auth…
The admin panel in the TeleMessage service through 2025-05-05 allows attackers to discover usernames, e-mail addresses, passwords, and telephone numb…
The TeleMessage service through 2025-05-05 configures Spring Boot Actuator with an exposed heap dump endpoint at a /heapdump URI, as exploited in the…
The TeleMessage archiving backend through 2025-05-05 accepts API calls (to request an authentication token) from the TM SGNL (aka Archive Signal) app…