CVE-2005-4427
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedMultiple SQL injection vulnerabilities in Cerberus Helpdesk allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary SQL commands via the (1) file_id parameter to attachment_send.php, (2) the $addy variable in email_parser.php, (3) $address variable in email_parser.php, (4) $a_address variable in structs.php, (5) kbid parameter to cer_KnowledgebaseHandler.class.php, (6) queues[] parameter to addresses_export.php, (7) $thread variable to display.php, (8) ticket parameter to display_ticket_thread.php.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceMultiple SQL injection vulnerabilities in Cerberus Helpdesk allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary SQL commands via eight different parameters including file_id in attachment_send.php, $addy/$address in email_parser.php, $a_address in structs.php, kbid in cer_KnowledgebaseHandler.class.php, queues[] in addresses_export.php, $thread in display.php, and ticket in display_ticket_thread.php.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 2.649CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Partial
- Integrity
- Partial
- Availability
- Partial
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Confirm Cerberus Helpdesk installationSearch the web server for Cerberus Helpdesk PHP files (attachment_send.php, email_parser.php, structs.php, cer_KnowledgebaseHandler.class.php, addresses_export.php, display.php, display_ticket_thread.php) or look for 'Cerberus' branding in application responsesAffected if Cerberus Helpdesk files are found running on the server
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Identify the installed versionCheck version.php or any version file included in the Cerberus installation, or look for version strings in the application source codeAffected if The version is exactly 2.649
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Verify the affected files are accessibleConfirm the six PHP files containing the SQL injection flaws exist in the deployment: attachment_send.php, email_parser.php, structs.php, cer_KnowledgebaseHandler.class.php, addresses_export.php, display.php, display_ticket_thread.phpAffected if These files exist and are web-accessible
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Check if the application processes user inputReview the affected parameters (file_id, addy/address, a_address, kbid, queues[], thread, ticket) in the respective files to confirm they accept user-supplied input without apparent sanitizationAffected if The application accepts and processes these parameters from user requests without prepared statements or input validation
You are affected if Cerberus Helpdesk version 2.649 is deployed and the vulnerable PHP files are web-accessible, as all eight parameters accept unsanitized user input leading to SQL injection.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataImplement parameterized queries (prepared statements) and strict input validation across all affected files to prevent SQL injection, followed by comprehensive testing to verify each attack vector is properly remediated.
- Consultation3.0 h
- Implementation12.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA3.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $6,720.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2005-4427 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2005-4427 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data