CVE-2006-0968
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe ncprwsnt service in NCP Network Communication Secure Client 8.11 Build 146, and possibly other versions, allows local users to execute arbitrary code by modifying the connect.bat script, which is automatically executed by the service after a connection is established.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe ncprwsnt service in NCP Secure Client executes connect.bat automatically after establishing a connection. Due to insufficient access controls, local unprivileged users can modify this script to execute arbitrary code with the service's elevated privileges, achieving local privilege escalation.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 8.11_build_146CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Complete
- Integrity
- Complete
- Availability
- Complete
AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Verify NCP Secure Client installation and versionCheck if NCP Secure Client version 8.11_build_146 is installed by reviewing installed programs or checking program directories for NCP Network Communications Secure ClientAffected if NCP Secure Client version 8.11_build_146 is installed
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Confirm ncprwsnt service presenceOpen Services console (services.msc) or run 'sc query ncprwsnt' to check if the NCP RWS NT service exists and is runningAffected if The ncprwsnt service exists and is configured to run on the system
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Locate connect.bat scriptSearch for connect.bat in common NCP installation directories such as C:\Program Files\NCP\ or C:\Program Files (x86)\NCP\, or check the service configuration for the executable pathAffected if connect.bat is found in an NCP installation directory
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Verify connect.bat write permissionsRight-click connect.bat, go to Properties > Security, and check the permissions for non-admin users. Alternatively, run 'icacls connect.bat' from an elevated command prompt to view ACLsAffected if Non-privileged users or the Users group have Write or Modify permissions to connect.bat
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Check service execution contextRun 'sc qc ncprwsnt' to view the service configuration, specifically checking the BINARY_PATH_NAME and START_TYPE. Verify if the service runs under a privileged account (like LocalSystem)Affected if The ncprwsnt service runs under an elevated account such as LocalSystem or Administrator
A user is affected if NCP Secure Client 8.11_build_146 is installed with the ncprwsnt service running, and connect.bat is writable by non-privileged local users.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataRestrict write access to connect.bat to only privileged accounts, and consider moving the script to a protected directory with administrator-only permissions, or implement script integrity verification.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation2.0 h
- Testing1.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2006-0968 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2006-0968 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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