CVE-2010-5203
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedMultiple untrusted search path vulnerabilities in NCP Secure Enterprise Client before 9.21 Build 68, Secure Entry Client before 9.23 Build 18, and Secure Client - Juniper Edition before 9.23 Build 18 allow local users to gain privileges via a Trojan horse (1) dvccsabase002.dll, (2) conman.dll, (3) kmpapi32.dll, or (4) ncpmon2.dll file in the current working directory, as demonstrated by a directory that contains a .pcf or .spd file. NOTE: some of these details are obtained from third party information.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThis is a DLL planting/untrusted search path vulnerability in NCP Secure Enterprise Client and related products. The application loads DLL files from the current working directory before checking system paths, allowing local attackers to place malicious DLLs (dvccsabase002.dll, conman.dll, kmpapi32.dll, ncpmon2.dll) that execute with elevated privileges when users open .pcf or .spd configuration files from attacker-controlled directories.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data<= 9.23<= 9.21<= 9.23CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- M
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Complete
- Integrity
- Complete
- Availability
- Complete
AV:L/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify if NCP Secure Client is installedCheck for the presence of NCP Secure Enterprise Client, NCP E Secure Client, or NCP E Secure Entry Client in the system. Look in typical installation paths such as C:\Program Files\NCP\ or C:\Program Files (x86)\NCP\, or check Windows Registry under HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\NCP or HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\NCP for installed NCP products.Affected if The product is found on the system.
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Determine the installed versionLocate the NCP client executable (typically ncpservice.exe, ncpclient.exe, or similar in the installation directory) and check its version. Right-click the executable, select Properties, and view the Details tab for Product Version, or use the command: wmic datafile where "name='C:\\Program Files\\NCP\\[executable_name].exe'" get VersionAffected if The version is 9.23 or lower for Secure Client/Entry Client, or 9.21 or lower for Enterprise Client.
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Verify .pcf and .spd file associationsCheck Windows Registry for file associations handling .pcf and .spd files. Look under HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\.pcf and HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\.spd, or check HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\.pcf and HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\.spd to see if they are associated with the NCP client application.Affected if The .pcf or .spd file extensions are associated with the NCP client, indicating the vulnerable file-loading behavior can be triggered.
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Check for vulnerable DLLs in application directoryInspect the NCP client installation directory for the presence of the known vulnerable DLL files: dvccsabase002.dll, conman.dll, kmpapi32.dll, ncpmon2.dll. Use File Explorer to list the DLL files in the installation folder or run: dir "C:\Program Files\NCP\*.dll"Affected if These specific DLL files exist in the NCP installation directory, confirming the vulnerable component is present.
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Confirm untrusted file opening behaviorThe vulnerability is triggered when a user opens a .pcf or .spd configuration file from a directory containing the malicious DLLs. This is a runtime behavior that occurs during file processing. There is no static config to check; the condition for exploitation is opening such files from untrusted directories (e.g., network shares, download folders).Affected if Users open .pcf or .spd configuration files from directories outside the trusted NCP installation folder, particularly from network shares or untrusted locations.
A user is affected if NCP Secure Client version 9.23 or lower (or Enterprise Client 9.21 or lower) is installed and users open .pcf or .spd configuration files, especially from untrusted directories where attacker-controlled DLLs could be placed.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataUpgrade to version 9.21 Build 68 or later for Enterprise Client, or 9.23 Build 18 or later for Secure Entry/Juniper editions. Avoid opening .pcf or .spd files from untrusted or network share locations.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation3.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2010-5203 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2010-5203 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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