CVE-2011-1418
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe stateless address autoconfiguration (aka SLAAC) functionality in the IPv6 networking implementation in Apple iOS before 4.3 and Apple TV before 4.2 places the MAC address into the IPv6 address, which makes it easier for remote IPv6 servers to track users by logging source IPv6 addresses.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe stateless address autoconfiguration (SLAAC) implementation in Apple iOS before 4.3 and Apple TV before 4.2 embeds the device's MAC address into the generated IPv6 address. This allows remote servers to track users by logging and correlating source IPv6 addresses, as the address remains stable and traceable to the hardware.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data<= 4.2= 1.0.0= 1.0.1= 1.0.2= 1.1.0= 1.1.1= 1.1.2= 1.1.3= 1.1.4= 1.1.5= 2.0= 2.0.0= 4.0<= 3.0.2= 1.0.0= 1.1.0= 2.0.0= 2.0.1= 2.0.2= 2.1.0CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Partial
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify the iOS versionGo to Settings > General > About on the iOS device and note the version number shown next to 'Version'Affected if The version is 4.2.x or earlier, or any of these: 1.0.0, 1.0.1, 1.0.2, 1.1.0, 1.1.1, 1.1.2, 1.1.3, 1.1.4, 1.1.5, 2.0, or 2.0.0
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Identify the Apple TV versionOn Apple TV, go to Settings > General > About and note the software versionAffected if The version is exactly 4.0, or tvOS is 3.0.2 or earlier, or any of these: 1.0.0, 1.1.0, 2.0.0, 2.0.1, 2.0.2, or 2.1.0
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Verify IPv6 is enabledOn iOS: go to Settings > General > Network > IPv6 (or check if IPv6 addresses are assigned). On Apple TV: check if the device has obtained an IPv6 address via the network settingsAffected if IPv6 is active and the device is using SLAAC for address configuration
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Inspect the IPv6 address patternView the device's IPv6 address (Settings > Wi-Fi > tap the connected network > IP Address on iOS, or via network diagnostics). Check if the last 64 bits of the address contain a pattern matching the device's MAC address (format: xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx encoded in EUI-64)Affected if The IPv6 address contains the device's MAC address in the interface identifier portion (visible as the last 8 hex octets)
You are affected if your device runs iOS 4.2 or earlier, Apple TV 4.0, or tvOS 3.0.2 or earlier, AND IPv6 is enabled and your generated IPv6 address embeds your MAC address in the interface identifier.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataUpdate to iOS 4.3 or later, or Apple TV 4.2 or later. These versions implemented RFC 4941 privacy extensions which use random temporary addresses instead of MAC-derived addresses. For legacy systems that cannot be updated, consider disabling IPv6 at the network level or implementing IPv6 traffic filtering.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Testing1.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2011-1418 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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