CxfApplication · Apache
CVE-2012-5786
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe wsdl_first_https sample code in distribution/src/main/release/samples/wsdl_first_https/src/main/ in Apache CXF before 2.7.0 does not verify that the server hostname matches a domain name in the subject's Common Name (CN) or subjectAltName field of the X.509 certificate, which allows man-in-the-middle attackers to spoof SSL servers via an arbitrary valid certificate. NOTE: The vendor states that the sample had specifically used a flag to bypass the DN check
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceApache CXF before 2.7.0 contained a vulnerable sample (wsdl_first_https) that disabled X.509 certificate hostname verification, allowing man-in-the-middle attackers to spoof SSL servers with any valid certificate. The sample explicitly configured a flag to bypass the Distinguished Name (DN) check, failing to validate that the server hostname matches the certificate's Common Name (CN) or subjectAltName field.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data
CxfApplication
<= 2.6.17CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- M
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Partial
- Integrity
- Partial
- Availability
- None
AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
-
Identify Apache CXF versionLocate the CXF jar files (typically in WEB-INF/lib for web applications or classpath) and check the version from the filename or manifest. Common jar names include cxf-*.jar. Use command: jar -tf cxf-*.jar | grep manifest to extract version info.Affected if The installed CXF version is 2.6.17 or earlier (any version <= 2.6.17).
-
Check for wsdl_first_https sample deploymentSearch for files or directories named 'wsdl_first_https' in the application deployment. This sample code demonstrates HTTPS client configuration with WSDL-first development.Affected if The wsdl_first_https sample or similar HTTPS client code is deployed in the environment.
-
Inspect SSL configuration for disabled hostname verificationExamine CXF SSL configuration files (often in XML configuration files or Java code that creates Bus/Client objects). Look for settings that disable certificate hostname validation, such as explicit TrustManager configuration or properties that set hostname verification to false or null.Affected if The configuration explicitly disables X.509 hostname verification (CN/subjectAltName validation is bypassed).
-
Look for DN bypass in TrustManager configurationSearch code and configuration for TrustManager implementations, particularly custom or sample TrustManagers that skip the Distinguished Name check. Look for patterns where hostname verification is explicitly disabled in the SSL context setup.Affected if A TrustManager or SSL setup explicitly bypasses DN/hostname validation, allowing any valid certificate to be accepted.
A user is affected if they run Apache CXF version 2.6.17 or earlier AND have deployed the wsdl_first_https sample or similar client code with SSL configuration that disables hostname verification.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataEnable proper hostname verification in the CXF SSL configuration by removing any trust manager configuration that disables CN/subjectAltName validation, or upgrade to Apache CXF 2.7.0 or later where this issue was resolved.
Fix this in Cxf
Scoped from the published advisory
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation2.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $2,224.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2012-5786 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2012-5786 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
Be the first to add a field note for this CVE — a mitigation you’ve verified, a version caveat, or a link to a working fix. Sign in above to contribute.
A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data