dbcve.org
Ethernet\/ip FirmwareOperating system · Rockwellautomation

CVE-2012-6442

HIGH · 7.5 CVSS v3.1 Published 2013-01-24
Mitigation only
No fix yet — a mitigation exists. There is no fixed release. A documented workaround reduces exposure in the meantime.
See remediation →
84/100
Remediation priority · High
Remotely reachable No privileges Zero-click

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
When an affected product receives a valid CIP message from an unauthorized or unintended source to Port 2222/TCP, Port 2222/UDP, Port 44818/TCP, or Port 44818/UDP that instructs the product to reset, a DoS can occur. This situation could cause loss of availability and a disruption of communication with other connected devices. Rockwell Automation EtherNet/IP products; 1756-ENBT, 1756-EWEB, 1768-ENBT, and 1768-EWEB communication modules; CompactLogix L32E and L35E controllers; 1788-ENBT FLEXLogix adapter; 1794-AENTR FLEX I/O EtherNet/IP adapter; ControlLogix 18 and earlier; CompactLogix 18 and earlier; GuardLogix 18 and earlier; SoftLogix 18 and earlier; CompactLogix controllers 19 and earlier; SoftLogix controllers 19 and earlier; ControlLogix controllers 20 and earlier; GuardLogix controllers 20 and earlier; and MicroLogix 1100 and 1400

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · moderate confidence

This is a denial-of-service vulnerability in Rockwell Automation EtherNet/IP products where valid CIP (Common Industrial Protocol) messages sent to ports 2222/TCP, 2222/UDP, 44818/TCP, or 44818/UDP from an unauthorized or unintended source can instruct affected devices to reset, causing loss of availability and disrupting communication with other connected devices.

MitigationRestrict network access to ports 2222 and 44818 using firewalls, VLANs, or network segmentation to prevent unauthorized CIP messages from reaching affected devices; apply vendor patches when available and consider industrial DMZ architectures.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.

NVD · CPE data
Ethernet\/ip FirmwareOperating system
Affected:all versions
Compactlogix FirmwareOperating system
Affected:all versions= 18
Flexlogix FirmwareOperating system
Affected:all versions
Flex I\/o Ethernet\/ip FirmwareOperating system
Affected:all versions
Micrologix FirmwareOperating system
Affected:all versions
Compactlogix Controllers FirmwareOperating system
Affected:= 19
Controllogix Controllers FirmwareOperating system
Affected:= 20
Controllogix FirmwareOperating system
Affected:= 18

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Privileges
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
None
Availability
High

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Identify Rockwell Automation EtherNet/IP devices on your network
    Inventory your industrial network for any Rockwell Automation controllers including CompactLogix, FlexLogix, Flex I/O EtherNet/IP, MicroLogix, or ControlLogix devices that use EtherNet/IP communication
    Affected if Any of these device types are present on the network, making them potential targets for the vulnerability
  2. Determine firmware version of affected devices
    Access the device programming software (RSLogix/Studio 5000) or check the device web interface to identify the installed firmware version
    Affected if The device runs any firmware version as indicated by 'all versions' in the affected list, or specifically versions 18, 19, or 20 for CompactLogix Controllers, ControlLogix Controllers, or ControlLogix respectively
  3. Verify if ports 2222 or 44818 are exposed on the network
    Use network scanning tools (nmap, netstat) to check if TCP/UDP ports 2222 and 44818 are listening and accessible on affected devices
    Affected if These EtherNet/IP CIP ports are open and responding on the device
  4. Check network access to CIP ports
    Review firewall rules, VLAN configurations, and access control lists to determine if ports 2222 and 44818 can be reached from unauthorized network segments or external sources
    Affected if The ports are accessible from network segments outside the trusted control network, enabling unauthorized CIP message injection
  5. Inspect CIP message filtering or monitoring
    Check industrial firewall, DMZ, or network monitoring systems for presence of CIP traffic validation or source authentication controls
    Affected if No CIP message filtering or source validation is implemented, allowing potentially malicious CIP messages to reach the device

You are affected if you have any Rockwell Automation CompactLogix, FlexLogix, Flex I/O EtherNet/IP, MicroLogix, or ControlLogix devices with ports 2222 or 44818 accessible from unauthorized network sources, as the vulnerability allows any CIP message to trigger a device reset.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

From vendor data
Mitigation available No clean upgrade yet — mitigate in the meantime
Mitigation

Restrict network access to ports 2222 and 44818 using firewalls, VLANs, or network segmentation to prevent unauthorized CIP messages from reaching affected devices; apply vendor patches when available and consider industrial DMZ architectures.

Fix this in Ethernet\/ip Firmware Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation4.0 h
  • Implementation8.0 h
  • Testing6.0 h
  • Review / QA2.0 h
20.0 hours of engineering $3,500
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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2012-6442 in production — separate from our analysis above.

No notes yet

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What this is

A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.

What belongs here
  • Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
  • No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
  • No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data