Allen Bradley L30erms FirmwareOperating system · Rockwellautomation

CVE-2017-9312

HIGH · 7.5 CVSS v3.0 Published 2018-06-25
Fix available
A fix is available. Upgrade to after 30 or later.
See remediation →
84/100
Remediation priority · High
Remotely reachable No privileges Zero-click

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
Improperly implemented option-field processing in the TCP/IP stack on Allen-Bradley L30ERMS safety devices v30 and earlier causes a denial of service. When a crafted TCP packet is received, the device reboots immediately.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · high confidence

A denial of service vulnerability exists in the TCP/IP stack of Allen-Bradley L30ERMS safety devices (version 30 and earlier) due to improper validation of the TCP option-field. When the device receives a specially crafted TCP packet with malformed option-field data, it triggers an immediate system reboot, causing loss of operational continuity.

MitigationUpgrade the L30ERMS firmware to a version beyond v30 that contains the corrected TCP/IP stack implementation; as a compensating control, implement network segmentation to restrict untrusted traffic from reaching the device.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.

NVD · CPE data
Allen Bradley L30erms FirmwareOperating system
Affected:<= 30

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Privileges
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
None
Availability
High

CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Identify device model
    Query the device or check asset inventory to confirm the exact model number is Allen-Bradley L30ERMS. This can be done via Rockwell RSLinx, FactoryTalk, or by checking device nameplates/documentation.
    Affected if Device is not an Allen-Bradley L30ERMS model, then not affected by this specific CVE.
  2. Check installed firmware version
    Access the device web interface, use RSLinx Classic or FactoryTalk Linx to query the device firmware version, or consult your CMDB/inventory system for the deployed firmware version.
    Affected if Firmware version is 30 or earlier (e.g., v20, v25, v30). Versions beyond v30 are not affected.
  3. Verify TCP/IP stack is enabled
    Confirm the device has TCP/IP communication enabled and is configured on the network. Check via device network settings in RSLinx or by attempting TCP connectivity to the device on ports 80, 443, or 2222.
    Affected if TCP/IP stack is disabled or device is not network-accessible, then the attack surface is not present.
  4. Assess network exposure
    Review network segmentation, firewall rules, and ACLs to determine if untrusted or external network traffic can reach the device. Check if the device is on an isolated OT network or DMZ.
    Affected if Device is directly accessible from untrusted networks without segmentation, making it vulnerable to malformed TCP packets from attackers.

A user is affected if they have an Allen-Bradley L30ERMS device with firmware version 30 or earlier that has TCP/IP enabled and is accessible from a network where malicious TCP packets could be sent to it.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

From vendor data
Upgrade available Upgrade to a release after 30
Interim mitigation

Upgrade the L30ERMS firmware to a version beyond v30 that contains the corrected TCP/IP stack implementation; as a compensating control, implement network segmentation to restrict untrusted traffic from reaching the device.

Fix this in Allen Bradley L30erms Firmware Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation4.0 h
  • Implementation3.0 h
  • Testing6.0 h
  • Review / QA2.0 h
15.0 hours of engineering $2,600
Get the upgrade done

An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $4,160.

Scan for this in your stack

Free · runs locally
dbcve dependency scanner

Check whether your project pulls in CVE-2017-9312 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.

References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2017-9312 in production — separate from our analysis above.

No notes yet

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What this is

A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.

What belongs here
  • Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
  • No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
  • No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data