CVE-2017-9852
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedAn Incorrect Password Management issue was discovered in SMA Solar Technology products. Default passwords exist that are rarely changed. User passwords will almost always be default. Installer passwords are expected to be default or similar across installations installed by the same company (but are sometimes changed). Hidden user accounts have (at least in some cases, though more research is required to test this for all hidden user accounts) a fixed password for all devices; it can never be changed by a user. Other vulnerabilities exist that allow an attacker to get the passwords of these hidden user accounts. NOTE: the vendor reports that it has no influence on the allocation of passwords, and that global hardcoded master passwords do not exist. Also, only Sunny Boy TLST-21 and TL-21 and Sunny Tripower TL-10 and TL-30 could potentially be affected
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceSMA Solar inverters (Sunny Boy TLST-21, TL-21, Sunny Tripower TL-10, TL-30) contain incorrect password management with default user passwords that are rarely changed, installer passwords shared across installations, and hidden user accounts with fixed passwords that cannot be changed by users. Additional vulnerabilities allow attackers to retrieve these hidden account passwords.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE dataall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify SMA Solar inverter models on the networkScan the network for SMA Sunny Boy or Sunny Tripower devices using their default HTTP ports (80/443) or check device documentation/inventory for model numbers matching the affected list: Sunny Boy 3600, Sunny Boy 5000, Sunny Tripower Core1, Sunny Tripower 15000tl, Sunny Tripower 20000tl, Sunny Tripower 25000tl, Sunny Tripower 5000tl, Sunny Tripower 12000tlAffected if Any of the listed inverter models are present in the environment
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Verify web interface accessibilityAttempt to access the inverter web interface by navigating to the device IP address on ports 80 or 443. Confirm the SMA login page loadsAffected if The inverter web management interface is reachable on the network
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Test for default user credentialsAttempt login to the web interface using common default credentials for SMA inverters (typically user: 'user' password: '0000' or check SMA documentation for default passwords). Also test the installer account default credentials if knownAffected if Default credentials (user or installer) still function without having been changed
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Check for hidden or secondary accountsIf authenticated to the web interface, navigate to user management or account settings. Look for any accounts beyond the standard user account, particularly accounts with elevated privileges or fixed passwords that cannot be modifiedAffected if Hidden accounts exist that were not created by administrators, or accounts have passwords that cannot be changed through the interface
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Verify network exposure of management interfaceDetermine if the inverter web interface IP is accessible from untrusted network segments (DMZ, guest networks, or the internet). Review firewall rules and network segmentation around the deviceAffected if The inverter management interface is accessible from network segments outside the trusted management network
The environment is affected if any SMA Sunny Boy or Sunny Tripower inverters from the listed models are present AND either default passwords are still active, hidden accounts exist, or the management interface is exposed to untrusted networks.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataImmediately change all default passwords, contact SMA vendor for firmware updates to address hidden accounts with hardcoded passwords, and implement network segmentation to isolate solar inverter management interfaces from untrusted networks.
- Consultation8.0 h
- Implementation16.0 h
- Testing8.0 h
- Review / QA4.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2017-9852 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2017-9852 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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