CVE-2017-9860
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedAn issue was discovered in SMA Solar Technology products. An attacker can use Sunny Explorer or the SMAdata2+ network protocol to update the device firmware without ever having to authenticate. If an attacker is able to create a custom firmware version that is accepted by the inverter, the inverter is compromised completely. This allows the attacker to do nearly anything: for example, giving access to the local OS, creating a botnet, using the inverters as a stepping stone into companies, etc. NOTE: the vendor reports that this attack has always been blocked by "a final integrity and compatibility check." Also, only Sunny Boy TLST-21 and TL-21 and Sunny Tripower TL-10 and TL-30 could potentially be affected
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceUnauthenticated firmware update vulnerability in SMA Solar Technology inverters (Sunny Boy TLST-21, TL-21, Sunny Tripower TL-10, TL-30) allows attackers to inject malicious firmware via Sunny Explorer or SMAdata2+ protocol without any authentication, achieving complete device compromise.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE dataall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify SMA inverter models on your networkInventory all network-connected solar inverters and identify the model numbers. Check device labels, management interfaces, or network scans for SMA Solar Technology devices (Sunny Boy TLST-21, TL-21, Sunny Tripower TL-10, TL-30, Core1, and 5000/12000/15000/20000/25000tl variants)Affected if Any of the identified inverters match the affected model families regardless of firmware version
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Locate Sunny Explorer or SMAdata2+ management interfacesScan your network for SMA device management services. Look for open ports typically used by Sunny Explorer (HTTP/HTTPS on the inverter's web interface) or SMAdata2+ protocol services. Check device documentation or use network scanning tools to identify these servicesAffected if The inverter management interfaces (Sunny Explorer web or SMAdata2+) are exposed and accessible on the network
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Verify network accessibility of firmware update functionalityCheck if the inverter's firmware update endpoint is reachable from your network segments. Confirm whether the device accepts firmware upload requests without requiring authentication credentialsAffected if Firmware update functionality is accessible without authentication from any network segment
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Assess network segmentation of inverter managementReview network firewall rules, VLAN assignments, and access control lists to determine if inverter management interfaces are isolated from untrusted network segments or the internetAffected if Inverter management interfaces are reachable from untrusted network segments or directly exposed to the internet
You are affected if any SMA inverter from the affected model families has its Sunny Explorer or SMAdata2+ management interface accessible on the network without network-based access controls preventing unauthorized firmware updates.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataImplement network segmentation to isolate inverter management interfaces from untrusted networks; verify vendor firmware updates are applied; monitor for unauthorized firmware update attempts.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation2.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA3.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2017-9860 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2017-9860 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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