CVE-2017-9861
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedAn issue was discovered in SMA Solar Technology products. The SIP implementation does not properly use authentication with encryption: it is vulnerable to replay attacks, packet injection attacks, and man in the middle attacks. An attacker is able to successfully use SIP to communicate with the device from anywhere within the LAN. An attacker may use this to crash the device, stop it from communicating with the SMA servers, exploit known SIP vulnerabilities, or find sensitive information from the SIP communications. Furthermore, because the SIP communication channel is unencrypted, an attacker capable of understanding the protocol can eavesdrop on communications. For example, passwords can be extracted. NOTE: the vendor's position is that authentication with encryption is not required on an isolated subnetwork. Also, only Sunny Boy TLST-21 and TL-21 and Sunny Tripower TL-10 and TL-30 could potentially be affected
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceThe SIP implementation in SMA Solar Technology inverters (Sunny Boy TLST-21, TL-21, Sunny Tripower TL-10, TL-30) lacks proper authentication and encryption, making it vulnerable to replay attacks, packet injection, and man-in-the-middle attacks. An attacker on the LAN can eavesdrop on unencrypted SIP communications, extract passwords and sensitive information, crash the device, or disrupt communication with SMA servers.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE dataall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify SMA inverter models on the networkInventory network devices and check for SMA Sunny Boy or Sunny Tripower model numbers (3600, 5000, Core1, 15000tl, 20000tl, 25000tl, 5000tl, 12000tl)Affected if Any of these specific SMA inverter models are present on the network
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Confirm SIP service availabilityScan for open SIP ports (UDP/TCP 5060) on the inverter IP addressesAffected if SIP port 5060 is exposed and accessible on the inverter
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Check for unencrypted SIP trafficCapture and inspect network traffic on port 5060 using a packet sniffer; verify if SIP signaling is unencrypted (plaintext SIP messages)Affected if SIP traffic is transmitted in plaintext without TLS encryption
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Verify SIP authentication configurationReview the inverter SIP/communication settings through its web interface or management console; check if authentication is required or enforced for SIP sessionsAffected if SIP authentication is disabled or not enforced on the device
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Check network exposureDetermine if the inverter SIP port is accessible from untrusted network segments beyond the local LAN segment where the device residesAffected if The SIP port is accessible from network segments outside the device's trusted local network
If any SMA Sunny Boy or Sunny Tripower inverter model from the affected list is present and has SIP port 5060 accessible with unencrypted communication, the environment is vulnerable to CVE-2017-9861.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataIsolate affected devices on a dedicated network segment/VLAN with strict firewall rules limiting SIP port access to authorized hosts only. Monitor for anomalous SIP traffic patterns. Consider compensating controls until hardware/firmware updates are available from vendor.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $5,600.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2017-9861 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2017-9861 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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