CVE-2017-9857
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedAn issue was discovered in SMA Solar Technology products. The SMAdata2+ communication protocol does not properly use authentication with encryption: it is vulnerable to man in the middle, packet injection, and replay attacks. Any setting change, authentication packet, scouting packet, etc. can be replayed, injected, or used for a man in the middle session. All functionalities available in Sunny Explorer can effectively be done from anywhere within the network as long as an attacker gets the packet setup correctly. This includes the authentication process for all (including hidden) access levels and the changing of settings in accordance with the gained access rights. Furthermore, because the SMAdata2+ communication channel is unencrypted, an attacker capable of understanding the protocol can eavesdrop on communications. NOTE: the vendor's position is that authentication with encryption is not required on an isolated subnetwork. Also, only Sunny Boy TLST-21 and TL-21 and Sunny Tripower TL-10 and TL-30 could potentially be affected
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceThe SMAdata2+ communication protocol used in SMA Solar inverters lacks proper authentication with encryption, making it vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks, packet injection, and replay attacks. Attackers can replay authentication packets, inject malicious packets, and eavesdrop on unencrypted communications to gain unauthorized access to all access levels and modify settings. Only specific Sunny Boy and Sunny Tripower models (TLST-21, TL-21, TL-10, TL-30) are affected.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE dataall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- High
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
-
Identify inverter modelLocate the device label on the inverter unit or access the inverter's web interface or SMA Speedwire configuration to identify the exact model (Sunny Boy 3600, Sunny Boy 5000, Sunny Tripower Core1, Sunny Tripower 15000tl, 20000tl, 25000tl, 5000tl, or 12000tl)Affected if The device model matches any of the affected models listed in the CVE
-
Verify SMAdata2+ protocol is enabledAccess the inverter network settings via the built-in web interface or SMA Sunny Portal configuration and check whether the SMAdata2+ communication protocol is configured for data exchangeAffected if SMAdata2+ protocol is enabled on the device
-
Check for encryption on SMA communication portsCapture network traffic on the SMA communication ports (typically UDP/TCP ports 5000-5001) using a packet sniffer and inspect whether the traffic is encrypted (encrypted SMA Speedwire uses SSL/TLS; unencrypted traffic will show plaintext data)Affected if Network traffic to/from the inverter on SMA ports is transmitted in plaintext without encryption
-
Inspect authentication settingsReview the SMA communication security settings in the inverter configuration to verify whether user authentication with encryption is required for accessAffected if Authentication is disabled or uses the default unencrypted SMAdata2+ protocol without user verification
You are affected if you operate any of the listed inverter models with SMAdata2+ protocol enabled and communications are unencrypted or lack proper authentication.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataImplement network segmentation to isolate affected devices from untrusted networks, and upgrade to a version of the protocol with proper encryption and authentication if available from the vendor.
- Consultation8.0 h
- Implementation40.0 h
- Testing16.0 h
- Review / QA8.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $20,224.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2017-9857 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2017-9857 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
Be the first to add a field note for this CVE — a mitigation you’ve verified, a version caveat, or a link to a working fix. Sign in above to contribute.
A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data