CVE-2017-9864
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedAn issue was discovered in SMA Solar Technology products. An attacker can change the plant time even when not authenticated in any way. This changes the system time, possibly affecting lockout policies and random-number generators based on timestamps, and makes timestamps for data analysis unreliable. NOTE: the vendor reports that this is largely irrelevant because it only affects log-entry timestamps, and because the plant time would later be reset via NTP. (It has never been the case that a lockout policy or random-number generator was affected.) Also, only Sunny Boy TLST-21 and TL-21 and Sunny Tripower TL-10 and TL-30 could potentially be affected
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceUnauthenticated remote attackers can modify the system time on affected SMA Solar inverters (Sunny Boy TLST-21, TL-21, Sunny Tripower TL-10, TL-30) via an API endpoint lacking proper authorization checks. This could affect timestamp reliability for logging and potentially impact lockout policies or timestamp-based RNGs, though the vendor claims these secondary impacts never occurred.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE dataall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify the SMA Solar inverter modelCheck the device label, web interface, or management console for the exact model number (e.g., Sunny Boy 3600, Sunny Tripower 15000tl)Affected if The model matches any of the affected products listed in the CVE (Sunny Boy 3600, Sunny Boy 5000, Sunny Tripower Core1, or any Sunny Tripower tl variant)
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Confirm firmware versionAccess the inverter's web interface or API and retrieve the firmware version informationAffected if Any firmware version is present on an affected model (all versions are vulnerable)
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Test unauthenticated time-setting API accessSend an unauthenticated HTTP request to the time-setting API endpoint (typically /api/datetime or similar endpoint exposed by SMA inverters) without providing login credentialsAffected if The request succeeds and returns a successful response without requiring authentication
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Verify time-setting function accessibilityAttempt to invoke the time configuration or NTP sync endpoint using the inverter's API without being logged inAffected if The API accepts and processes the time-setting request without returning an authentication or authorization error
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Check for authentication on time-related endpointsReview API access logs or attempt time modification with various authentication states (logged in vs logged out)Affected if Time can be modified without any authentication token or session
If the device is any of the affected SMA Solar inverter models and the time-setting API is accessible without authentication, the environment is vulnerable to CVE-2017-9864.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataImplement proper authentication and authorization checks for all time-setting functions, restricting this capability to authenticated and authorized users only. Consider implementing NTP synchronization with trusted sources as the primary time source to minimize impact of any time manipulation.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA4.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2017-9864 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2017-9864 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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