CVE-2018-0306
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedA vulnerability in the CLI parser of Cisco NX-OS Software could allow an authenticated, local attacker to perform a command-injection attack on an affected device. The vulnerability is due to insufficient input validation of command arguments. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by injecting malicious command arguments into a vulnerable CLI command. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to execute arbitrary commands with root privileges on the affected device. Note: This vulnerability requires that any feature license is uploaded to the device. The vulnerability does not require that the license be used. This vulnerability affects MDS 9000 Series Multilayer Switches, Nexus 1000V Series Switches, Nexus 1100 Series Cloud Services Platforms, Nexus 2000 Series Fabric Extenders, Nexus 3000 Series Switches, Nexus 3500 Platform Switches, Nexus 3600 Platform Switches, Nexus 5500 Platform Switches, Nexus 5600 Platform Switches, Nexus 6000 Series Switches, Nexus 7000 Series Switches, Nexus 7700 Series Switches, Nexus 9000 Series Switches in standalone NX-OS mode, Nexus 9500 R-Series Line Cards and Fabric Modules. Cisco Bug IDs: CSCve51693, CSCve91634, CSCve91659, CSCve91663.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceA command injection vulnerability exists in the CLI parser of Cisco NX-OS Software. An authenticated local attacker with access to the device CLI can inject malicious command arguments into vulnerable CLI commands due to insufficient input validation. Successful exploitation grants the attacker arbitrary command execution with root privileges on the affected device. The attack requires that a feature license file is present on the device (uploaded but not necessarily active).
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data< 7.3\(3\)n1\(1\)= 8.1\(0.2\)s0= 8.1\(0\)bd\(0.20\)= 8.1\(0.59\)s0= 8.1\(1\)= 6.0\(2\)a8\(3\)< 5.2\(1\)sv3\(3.15\)< 8.1\(1a\)CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Determine NX-OS versionRun 'show version' command in the device CLI and locate the NX-OS release string in the outputAffected if The version matches any of these patterns: < 7.3(3)n1(1), = 8.1(0.2)s0, = 8.1(0)bd(0.20), = 8.1(0.59)s0, = 8.1(1), = 6.0(2)a8(3), < 5.2(1)sv3(3.15), or < 8.1(1a)
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Verify presence of feature license filesRun 'show license' command in the CLI to list installed license files, or check the bootflash: directory for .lic filesAffected if Any feature license file is present on the device (uploaded license files, whether active or inactive)
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Confirm license file typeExamine the license file names or run 'show license usage' to identify if they are feature licenses versus base licensesAffected if Feature license files are present (as opposed to only base/default licenses)
A device is affected if it runs a vulnerable NX-OS version listed above AND has at least one feature license file present on the system.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor data5.27.38.1
Apply the Cisco patches for CVE-2018-0306 corresponding to the specific NX-OS version running on affected devices. Until patches are applied, restrict local administrative access to trusted personnel only and remove unused feature license files to reduce the attack surface.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2018-0306 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2018-0306 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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