CVE-2018-0313
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedA vulnerability in the NX-API feature of Cisco NX-OS Software could allow an authenticated, remote attacker to send a malicious packet to the management interface on an affected system and execute a command-injection exploit. The vulnerability is due to incorrect input validation of user-supplied data to the NX-API subsystem. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a malicious HTTP or HTTPS packet to the management interface of an affected system that has the NX-API feature enabled. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to execute arbitrary commands with root privileges. Note: NX-API is disabled by default. This vulnerability affects MDS 9000 Series Multilayer Switches, Nexus 2000 Series Fabric Extenders, Nexus 3000 Series Switches, Nexus 3500 Platform Switches, Nexus 5500 Platform Switches, Nexus 5600 Platform Switches, Nexus 6000 Series Switches, Nexus 7000 Series Switches, Nexus 7700 Series Switches, Nexus 9000 Series Switches in standalone NX-OS mode, Nexus 9500 R-Series Line Cards and Fabric Modules. Cisco Bug IDs: CSCvd47415, CSCve03216, CSCve03224, CSCve03234.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe NX-API feature in Cisco NX-OS software contains a command injection vulnerability due to insufficient input validation of user-supplied data. An authenticated attacker can send malicious HTTP/HTTPS packets to the management interface of affected systems with NX-API enabled, allowing execution of arbitrary commands with root privileges.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 7.0\(0\)hsk\(0.357\)= 8.0\(1\)s20= 8.1\(0\)bd\(0.20\)= 8.1\(0.97\)s0= 8.1\(1\)s5all versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Confirm NX-API feature statusRun the command 'show feature | include nxapi' on the Cisco NX-OS device CLI to check if NX-API is enabled. If the output shows 'nxapi' with a status of 'enabled', the feature is active.Affected if NX-API is enabled on the device (status shows 'enabled' or '1')
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Check NX-OS software versionRun the command 'show version' on the Cisco NX-OS device CLI and locate the version string in the output. Compare your installed version against the affected versions: 7.0(0)hsk(0.357), 8.0(1)s20, 8.1(0)bd(0.20), 8.1(0.97)s0, 8.1(1)s5, or any version that matches the pattern of these branches.Affected if The installed NX-OS version matches one of the affected versions or falls within the vulnerable version branches (7.0, 8.0, 8.1 series as listed)
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Verify NX-API management interface configurationRun the command 'show running-config | include nxapi' to review the NX-API configuration, including whether the management interface is configured to accept HTTP/HTTPS connections.Affected if NX-API is configured and bound to an accessible management interface (HTTP or HTTPS is enabled)
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Confirm management access authenticationReview the NX-API configuration using 'show running-config' to verify that authentication is properly configured for NX-API access.Affected if NX-API is enabled and accessible without proper authentication enforcement (authentication is weak or misconfigured)
The environment is affected if NX-API is enabled AND the NX-OS version matches one of the affected versions listed in the CVE, making the device vulnerable to authenticated command injection via malicious HTTP/HTTPS requests.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataIf NX-API is not required, ensure it remains disabled. If enabled, apply the appropriate Cisco patches for CSCvd47415/CSCve03216/CSCve03224/CSCve03234. Verify all management access uses proper authentication and consider network segmentation of management interfaces.
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- Implementation6.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2018-0313 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2018-0313 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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