Rp 210e FirmwareOperating system · Auto Maskin

CVE-2018-5401

MEDIUM · 5.9 CVSS v3.0 Published 2018-10-08
Mitigation only
No fix yet — a mitigation exists. There is no fixed release. A documented workaround reduces exposure in the meantime.
See remediation →
68/100
Remediation priority · Elevated
Remotely reachable No privileges Zero-click

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
The Auto-Maskin DCU 210E, RP-210E, and Marine Pro Observer Android App transmit sensitive or security-critical data in cleartext in a communication channel that can be sniffed by unauthorized actors. The devices transmit process control information via unencrypted Modbus communications. Impact: An attacker can exploit this vulnerability to observe information about configurations, settings, what sensors are present and in use, and other information to aid in crafting spoofed messages. Requires access to the network. Affected releases are Auto-Maskin DCU-210E, RP-210E, and Marine Pro Observer Android App. Versions prior to 3.7 on ARMv7.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · high confidence

Auto-Maskin DCU-210E, RP-210E, and Marine Pro Observer Android App transmit process control data via unencrypted Modbus communications, allowing network-adjacent attackers to sniff sensitive configuration, sensor, and settings data that could enable spoofed message attacks.

MitigationImplement encrypted Modbus communications (e.g., Modbus/TCP with TLS wrapper) or establish a VPN tunnel for the network segment, and apply vendor firmware updates (v3.7+) when available.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.

NVD · CPE data
Rp 210e FirmwareOperating system
Affected:all versions
Dcu 210e FirmwareOperating system
Affected:all versions
Marine Pro ObserverApplication
Affected:all versions

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Network
Complexity
High
Privileges
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
None
Availability
None

CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Identify Marine Pro Observer app installation
    Check Android devices for the Marine Pro Observer app in installed applications list, or query mobile device management (MDM) systems for app presence
    Affected if The Marine Pro Observer app is installed on any Android device on the network
  2. Detect DCU-210E or RP-210E devices on network
    Scan network for Modbus/TCP traffic on port 502, or check network inventory for Auto-Maskin DCU-210E or RP-210E devices using network discovery tools or asset inventories
    Affected if Auto-Maskin DCU-210E or RP-210E devices are present on the network
  3. Verify Modbus traffic encryption status
    Capture network traffic on segments containing these devices using packet capture tools (e.g., Wireshark, tcpdump) and inspect Modbus/TCP communications for encryption indicators - unencrypted Modbus frames will show cleartext protocol data
    Affected if Modbus communications are observed without TLS encryption or without being tunneled through a VPN
  4. Check network segmentation and VPN status
    Review network architecture diagrams and firewall rules to determine if the industrial control system (ICS) network segment is isolated and whether VPN tunneling is implemented for remote access to the Modbus network
    Affected if The Modbus network segment is directly accessible without VPN tunnel or lacks network isolation from untrusted networks

You are affected if you have Marine Pro Observer app deployed, or DCU-210E/RP-210E devices on your network, AND those devices communicate via unencrypted Modbus without VPN protection.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

From vendor data
Mitigation available No clean upgrade yet — mitigate in the meantime
Mitigation

Implement encrypted Modbus communications (e.g., Modbus/TCP with TLS wrapper) or establish a VPN tunnel for the network segment, and apply vendor firmware updates (v3.7+) when available.

Fix this in Rp 210e Firmware Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation8.0 h
  • Implementation16.0 h
  • Testing8.0 h
  • Review / QA4.0 h
36.0 hours of engineering $6,400
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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2018-5401 in production — separate from our analysis above.

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What this is

A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.

What belongs here
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  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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