CVE-2018-5402
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe Auto-Maskin DCU 210E, RP-210E, and Marine Pro Observer Android App use an embedded webserver that uses unencrypted plaintext for the transmission of the administrator PIN Impact: An attacker once authenticated can change configurations, upload new configuration files, and upload executable code via file upload for firmware updates. Requires access to the network. Affected releases are Auto-Maskin DCU-210E, RP-210E, and the Marine Pro Observer Android App. Versions prior to 3.7 on ARMv7.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe Auto-Maskin DCU 210E, RP-210E, and Marine Pro Observer Android App contain an embedded webserver that transmits the administrator PIN in unencrypted plaintext. An authenticated attacker with network access can change configurations, upload new configuration files, and upload executable code via the firmware update mechanism.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE dataall versionsall versionsall versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify the installed productDetermine if the system is an Auto-Maskin DCU 210E, RP-210E, or Marine Pro Observer device. Check the device label, firmware identification interface, or Marine Pro Observer Android app metadata.Affected if The product is any of these three and the firmware/app version is below 3.7 (ARMv7 devices) or unpatched (all versions).
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Check the firmware or app versionAccess the device admin interface or check the Marine Pro Observer app version in Android settings under Apps > Marine Pro Observer. Compare the version to 3.7 for ARMv7 devices.Affected if Version is below 3.7 on ARMv7 hardware, or the device/app is running any version since the advisory states all versions are affected.
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Verify webserver network exposureDetermine if the embedded webserver is accessible from the network by checking open ports (typically HTTP on port 80/8080) using a network scan or reviewing firewall rules and network configuration.Affected if The webserver is exposed to untrusted network segments, enabling external attackers to reach the authentication interface.
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Inspect PIN transmission for plaintextCapture network traffic between the client and the embedded webserver during login or admin sessions using a packet sniffer. Examine if the admin PIN is transmitted unencrypted in the HTTP request or response.Affected if The admin PIN is sent in plaintext over HTTP rather than HTTPS, allowing network observers to intercept credentials.
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Confirm authentication is requiredTest access to configuration upload and firmware update functions. Attempt to access these features without valid credentials to determine if authentication is enforced.Affected if The webserver permits configuration changes or firmware uploads without proper authentication, or uses weak/default credentials.
A user is affected if they run any version of DCU 210E, RP-210E, or Marine Pro Observer with the embedded webserver exposed to the network and the admin PIN transmitted in plaintext.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataUpgrade to version 3.7 or later on ARMv7 devices. Implement network segmentation and access controls to limit exposure to untrusted networks since the vulnerability requires network access.
- Consultation3.0 h
- Implementation6.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2018-5402 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2018-5402 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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