CVE-2019-10964
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedMedtronic MiniMed Insulin Pumps are designed to communicate using a wireless RF with other devices, such as blood glucose meters, glucose sensor transmitters, and CareLink USB devices. This wireless RF communication protocol does not properly implement authentication or authorization. An attacker with adjacent access to one of the affected insulin pump models can inject, replay, modify, and/or intercept data. This vulnerability could also allow attackers to change pump settings and control insulin delivery.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceMedtronic MiniMed Insulin Pumps use a wireless RF protocol to communicate with blood glucose meters, sensors, and CareLink USB devices. The protocol lacks proper authentication and authorization controls, allowing an attacker with adjacent (physical proximity) access to inject, replay, modify, or intercept data. This could enable attackers to alter pump settings and control insulin delivery.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE dataall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Adjacent
- Complexity
- High
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- Low
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify your insulin pump modelLocate the model number on the back of the insulin pump device or check product documentation and packaging. Look for model numbers such as 508, 511, 512, 712, 712e, 515, 715, or 522.Affected if The pump model matches any of the following: Minimed 508, Paradigm 511, Paradigm 512, Paradigm 712, Paradigm 712e, Paradigm 515, Paradigm 715, or Paradigm 522.
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Check the installed firmware versionAccess the pump's settings menu. Navigate to the Utilities or About section on the pump display to view the firmware version. The version is typically displayed as a number (e.g., 2.4A, 3.0B).Affected if The pump is one of the affected models listed above and has any firmware version installed.
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Verify wireless RF communication is activeCheck if the pump is currently paired or connected to any wireless devices such as blood glucose meters, continuous glucose sensors, or CareLink USB devices. Look for connection indicators on the pump screen or check the device history/menu.Affected if The pump has wireless pairing enabled or has ever been paired with external RF devices like glucose meters or sensors.
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Determine proximity risk exposureAssess whether the pump is used in public places where nearby attackers could have physical proximity (within wireless range). Consider typical usage locations such as home, work, or public venues.Affected if The pump is used in environments where unauthorized individuals could be within wireless range of the device.
You are affected if you own any of the following pump models: MiniMed 508, Paradigm 511, Paradigm 512, Paradigm 712, Paradigm 712e, Paradigm 515, Paradigm 715, or Paradigm 522, and you use wireless RF communication with paired devices.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataImplement cryptographic authentication and authorization for all RF communications between the insulin pump and paired devices. This requires a firmware update with proper session management, message authentication codes, and challenge-response mechanisms.
- Consultation40.0 h
- Implementation160.0 h
- Testing80.0 h
- Review / QA40.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $89,600.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2019-10964 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2019-10964 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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